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A. WHY BXAMINE KINORITY OFFICER RETENTION DORING THE 
DRAWDOWN? 
Minori ty representation in the U. S. Armed Forces has long 
been a subject of considerable concern to policy makers and 
elected officials. Since the advent of the All-Volunteer 
Force, the discussion has centered mostly on the trade-off 
between the peacetime benefits and the wartime burdens 
associ a ted with minorities and military service (Binkin and 
Eitelberg, 1982) . The dilemma stems from the fact that, 
following the end of conscription in 1973, minorities, 
especially blacks, began entering the military in increasing 
numbers. By the end of the 1980'S blacks represented more than 
20 percent of the nation's military, and in the Army's 
enlisted ranks, African-American representation exceeded 30 
percent. (Binkin. 1993) 
Many who viewed this phenomenon considered it a good 
thing. The military is generally thought of as being less 
racially discriminatory than other civilian institutions in 
our society. and is also viewed as an important source of 
valuable education, training, and job experience. In short, 
the military is considered a "great place to start," 
especially for young minorities interested in upward economic 
and social mobility. (Binkin and Eitelberg, 1982) 
Others view this influx of minorities into the military 
less generously. They have stressed that the desired 
opportunities present during peacetime must be balanced 
against the potential perils when the nation is at war. Some 
argue t hat it is inequitable, even immora l, for one segment of 
the population to bear a disproportionate share of the 
nation's defense, especially when that segment has not fully 
enjoyed its share of the nation's benefits. (BinJdn and 
Eitelberg, 1982) 
Indeed, in the early years of the Vietnam conflict, 1961 
through 1966, blacks sustained just over 20 percent of the 
Army combat deaths, while constituting only 11 percent of the 
U.S. population between the ages of 19 and 21. The death rate 
was, however, commensurate with black representation in Army 
combat units, prompting very vocal opposition toward the war 
and the draft by black leaders, including Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. By the end of the war, new Army assignment pOlicies 
and practices had reduced the overall Vietnam-related death 
rate for blacks to just over 13 percent 1972. (Binkin and 
Eitelberg, 1982) 
As the Vietnam Era passed and faded quickly into memory, 
the minority representation issue seemed to wax and wane in 
the eyes of defense policymakers. Concern about the 
racial/ethnic composition of the military probably peaked in 
1979, when blacks accounted for nearly 37 percent of the 
Army's recruits . The decade of the 1980s saw most observers 
content to let market forces determine the extent of minority 
participation in the armed forces. However, in early August of 
1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. It soon became apparent that the 
U.S. and its allies were committed to using force, if 
necessary, to liberate Kuwait. As scenarios began to develop, 
military experts speculated that a ground war was likely to 
generate a large number of casualties . Once again, as happened 
two decades earlier with Vietnam, racial representation in the 
military regained prominence in the public's eye. Many black 
leaders, including the Rev. Jesse Jackson, condemned American 
involvement in the Persian Gulf, and argued that the country 
could not afford to lose a large number of high-aptitude young 
blacks in a foreign war. (8inkin, 1993) 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, Army General 
Colin Powell, disagreed, however, with the concern 
disproportionate black casualties. He stated that this 
decision had been made when the country decided to shift to 
the All-volunteer Force in 1973. (Binkin, 1993) 
Quite simply, the Gulf War did not develop as pred i cted, 
and the controversy came to an abrupt end. Of the 375 U.S. 
casualties in operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield, 16.8 
percent were black. (Eitelberg, 1991). As attention tUrned 
away from the battlefield and back toward reducing the budget, 
concerns for minorities also shifted toward the economic 
realm. (Binkin, 1993) 
This discussion thus far has centered primarily on 
minorities as enlisted members of the armed forces, but What 
about minorities as officers? The running debate concerning 
black overrepresentation in the enlisted ranks has dominated 
discussion of minority participation in the military. Yet, 
blacks and other minorities have also been considerably 
underrepresented in the military's officer corps since the 
time nonwhites were permitted to serve in this capacity. Many 
point to the huge disparity between minority representation in 
the enlisted and officer ranks as a key factor in the racial 
unrest of the 1960s and 1970s (Kitfield, 1994). Military 
manpower offici als have also stressed the importance of 
minority recruits being able to identify with positive role 
models in leadership posi tions (Ki tf ieId, 1994). Additionally, 
many minority groups feel that, if they are not proportionally 
represented in the officer corps, especia l ly at the senior 
l e v e ls, they may not receive fair treatment when it comes to 
formulating and implementing manpower policies. 
How, then, are these issues complicated by a downsizing 
environment? with t he proposed and partially implemented 
reduction in military lIlanpower (as of early 1995) through the 
defense drawdown, many minority leaders as well as the media 
have expressed concerns that blacks and others may be forced 
out of a smaller military (Binkin, 1993). As the requirement 
for new members, both officers and enlisted, decreases, t he 
Services can afford to be more selective in the quality of 
applicants they accept. Since there are significant 
differences between whites and minorities in levels of 
education, as well in the test scores and other criteria used 
to select new officers and enlistees, the fear is that 
minorities will bear the brunt of the military's decreased 
need for personnel. (Binkin, 1993) 
Additionally, there are some indications that the black 
population may be losing interest in military service. An 
annual attitude survey of high school seniors recently 
reported a 45 percent decrease in the propensity of black 
youths to enlist in the Army between 1991 and 1993 (Kitfield 
1994). Couple that with the Army's inexplicable, widening gap 
in the promotion rates of minorities and non-minorities to the 
ranks of major and lieutenant colonel from 1990 to 1992, and 
apparent difficulties of the military's senior leaders in 
dealing with accusations of alleged racial discrimination 
(Kitfield, 1994), one can see that minority issues will 
remain, and perhaps intensify, throughout the drawdown. 
Presumably, all of these issues--the benefits versus 
burden dilemma, rumors of inequity within the promotion 
system, decreased numbers of service members, and a possible 
decline in the propensity of young minorities to enter the 
military--have an impact on the observed retention behavior of 
minority officers. External to these issues within the 
military, it must be noted that there is a keen competition 
between the military and the private sector for highly 
qualified minorities. These minorities must be accessed before 
they can be retained. Considering these problems, one finds 
that the discussion of minority officer retention during the 
drawdown takes on greater relevance. 
Finally, although Department of Defense poliCies have 
supported the recruitment and retention of qualified 
minorities in all phases of the manpower system, drawdown 
policies have been designed primarily to meet endstrength 
goals without consideration of any potential effects on 
specific groups. Similarly, the military downsizing has 
eliminated many positions and facilities that may affect the 
opportunities for some officer groups differently than for 
others. This myriad of factors must be considered when 
discussing the current state of minority officer retention. 
B. 8COPB DO OBJBCTIVES 
Utilizing cross-sectional and cohort data provided by the 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), this thesis seeks to 
determine whether differences exist in the retention of 
minority and non-minor i ty off icers; and, if differences are 
found, whether they have changed during the defense downsizing 
or can be linked to particular policies. Additionally, the 
research attempts to identify the impact of a specific, 
widely-used drawdown program, namely the Voluntary separation 
IncentiVe/Special Separation Bonus (VSI/SSB). on minority and 
nan-minority officers. 
Retention decisions are not independent of certain other 
factors. such as promotion and accession. Consequently. these 
factors are also considered in the context of their effect on 
retention. It should be emphasized that the scope of this 
research is very broad in that it examines all services, all 
officer paygrades, and all occupational specialties. 
Consequently, many of the comparisons presented must be 
general in nature, especially with respect to cross-service 
information on occupational representation. The strongest 
concluliions are drawn from the empirical analysis for each 
individual service branch. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research questions addressed by this thesis 
• How has the racial mix of the officer corps changed 
across services, paygrades, and occupations during the 
drawdown period (fiscal 1988 to present)? 
• Do 5ignificant differences exist in the 
retention/separation behavior of non-minority and 
minority officers, and, if so, have these differences 
increased or decreased over the drawdown period? 
• What factors, including racial/ethnic background, have 
had the greatest impact on officer retention throughout 
the drawdown period? 
• Do significant differences exist in VSI/SSB acceptance 
rates of officers acrOS5 racial/ethnic group5, and what 
other factors appear to be important in the acceptance 
decision? 
D. ORGANI ZATION OF STlJ'DY 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into four 
chapters. Chapter II reviews literature pertinent to the 
subjects of minority representation and management downsizing, 
as well as links between the two separate streams of research. 
Downsizing in both the military and civilian sectors is 
considered, as well as recent research regarding retention and 
separation incentives. Chapter III presents the data as well 
as the methodologies used to analyze the multiple data files 
that were created for this research effort. Chapter IV then 
presents the results of the analyses. Chapter V follows with 
conclusions and recommendations based upon the findings from 
previous chapters. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. XINORI'l'Y REPRBSElfTA'l'ION 
1. Introduction 
When discuss ing minority underrepres entation in the 
officer corps, as well as other minority representation 
issues, three broad areas of national policy are often called 
into question (Eitelberg and Binkin, 1982) . The first of 
these policy areas has been termed "political legitimacy" and 
s t ates that a force drawn proportionately from society is most 
likely to respect and advance society's values and goals. 
Conversely, an unrepresentative force might place parochia l 
interests above the interests of society as a whole. (Armor, 
1 9 91) 
The second policy area involves concerns over "force 
effectiveness." It is generally accepted that a higher 
quality force (in terms of education and aptitude) will 
exhibit greater effectiveness in combat; and, therefore, an 
unrepresentative force might be less effective if it is 
disproportionatel y comprised of less-educated, lower-aptitude 
individuals. (Armor, 199 1 ) 
The third, and perhaps most fundamental policy area, 
concerns the "social equity" of a military force. This 
addresses the extent to which the burden and risk of defending 
the nation is borne by all segments of the population. 
Placing this burden disproportionately on one socioeconomic or 
racial/ethnic group is viewed by many as inequita ble (Armor, 
1991) . The friction that has resulted from the opposing goals 
of allowing previously underprivileged groups the economic 
benefits of military service, while at the same time carrying 
a proportionate share of the defense burden, is often termed 
the "benefits versus burdens dilemma" (Binkin and Eitelberg, 
1982) . 
From these three areas of national policy, directly 
related to social representation, stem multiple conflicting 
objectives. A reasonable balance or compromise must be sought 
to ease the tensions between the goals of political 
legitimacy, force effectiveness, and social equity. (Eitelberg 
and Binkin, 1982) 
2. Bquity and Bt't'ectiven ••• 
Discussion over the conflicting goa l s of obtaining a 
racially balanced officer corps and maintaining force 
effectiveness are not new to America's military . consider the 
following quotation from a War Department memorandUlll dated 
July 13, 1918: 
1. The claim ... , that for each 250 colored men 
there should, in equity, be 5 colored officers, or 
4,000 colored officers for the 200,000 colored men 
now called into the service instead of 1,000, the 
actual number, presupposes that there is an 
unlimited supply of colored men with sufficient 
education, intelligence and with qualities of 
leadership to meet all demands. Our experience is 
to the contrary .... 
2. It is not believed that the colored race is 
entitled to any definite number or proportion of 
colored officers as a matter of right or equity. 
At the same time it is believed that it is very 
desirable that all these colored men who have the 
intelligence and force of character to become 
capable off icers in the lower grades should be 
given an opportunity to obtain a commission. The 
number of colored men capable of developing into 
commissioned officers will be quite small at 
best . . . • Officers must be of the best obtainable 
material .•.. sentiment should have no place in the 
selection of officers where such sentiment would be 
detrimental to efficiency .... (Jervey, 1918) 
As can be seen, for at least the past 75 years, military 
manpower officials and policy makers have grappled with the 
task of obtaining qualified minority officers. For three 
decades following World War I, minority staffing 
focused predominantly on the Army's all black units. With the 
racial integration of the military in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, the civil Rights movement of the 1960s, and the end of 
the draft in the 1970s, these concerns shifted toward creating 
equal opportunities for minorities in the military and 
achieving some measure of racial/ethnic representation across 
all services, all ranks, and all occupational specialties. 
Before one considers the question of how to fill the 
military with a racially representative mix, a more basic 
question needs to be addressed: "Is it even desirable to have 
a fully representative force; and, if so, at what cost?" Each 
of the services is charged with the task of fielding the 
strongest and most capable force, giVen available resources. 
complete or "perfect" representation would require that the 
worst as well as the best elements of our society be present 
in the military; and that the military recruit and retain not 
the most qualified force, but the most representative. 
Obviously, however, the lowering or elimination of entry 
criteria or performance standards to maintain a representative 
force would be contrary to national security goals. (Eitelberg 
and Binkin, 198 2) 
At the same time, the disproportionate representation of 
social, economic, racial, or ethnic categories may itself h ave 
an adverse influence on force effectiveness (Eitelberg and 
Binkin, 1982). Although the Defense Manpower Commission 
addressed this issue in 1975 and found no evidence t hat 
socioeconomic composition affects readiness (Eitelberg and 
Binkin, 1982), many manpower experts believe that the huge 
disparity between minority representation in the enlisted and 
off icer ranks was a key factor in the racial unrest present in 
the military in the late 19605 and 1970s (Kitfield. 1994). 
This racial unrest actually escalated into rioting at Camp 
Lejuene and Kaneohe Naval Air station in 1969, Travis Air 
Force Base in 1971, and onboard the carriers Kitty Hawk and 
Constellation in 1972: (Segal, 1989). 
without hard evidence on the requirements for population 
representation, many questions pertaining to effectiveness 
have persisted throughout the period of the All-Volunteer 
Force. Some of these questions, presented by Ei telberg and 
Binkin (1982), are reiterated here: 
• How do racial imbalances affect the unity, cohesion and 
morale of a force? 
• Does intergroup diversity reduce 
effectiveness in the field? 
improve 
• What impacts would an unrepresentative force have on 
civil-military relations? 
• What impact does public opinion concerning social 
representation have on force effectiveness? 
• How does racial representation in the armed forces 
affect credibility with our allies and potential 
adversaries? 
Although it is entirely likely that the effectiveness of the 
military is influenced by representation factors, the manner 
and degree of influence is open to speculation and d e bate 
(Eitel berg and Binkin, 1982). 
One must remember, however, that the goals of military 
effectiveness are not independent of concerns for political 
legitimacy and social equity. The military, although 
obviously concerned with personnel quality, must likewise 
support the legal, political, or societal principles 
legitimacy and equity. The problem is exacerbated by the fact 
that there appears to be a strong correlation between racial 
background and the factors used by the military in its 
selection process. For example, blacks have historically 
scored lower on college entrance exams (such as the Scholastic 
Aptitude Test or Academic College Test) than other ethnic 
groups (Dubois, 1983). Since scores on these exams are used 
as a quality measure for candidates attempting to enter an 
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officer accession program, the goals of effectiveness and 
equity clash head on. Hence, there exists a basic conflict of 
purpose. Force effectiveness requires certain standards for 
entry, promotion, and retention; at the same time, the armed 
forces are expected to be a reflection of society. (Eitelberg 
and Binkin, 1982) 
3. current 'l'renc!. ill Attitude 
Given the prevailing political winds and the tide of 
public opinion, it appears that a greater emphasis is being 
placed upon achieving an officer corps that is representative 
of the country's racial or ethnic make-up than was present in 
the past. For example, in June of 1994, Secretary of the Navy 
John Dalton announced that the Navy and Marine Corps should be 
taking in new minority officers at approximately their share 
of the popul a tion by 2001 (Fuentes and Pexton, 1994). This 
would require the minority officer representation in the Navy 
and Marine Corps to be approximately 12 percent black, 12 
percent Hispanic, and 5 percent Asian/Pacific Islander 
(Fuentes and Pexton, 1994). This changes previous policy 
that, based upon Department of Education statistics, targeted 
black and Hispanic representation at 4.5 and 2.4 percent, 
respectively (Chief of Naval Personnel, 1994). The Army and 
Air Force have similar plans. 
These goals are quite ambitious, indeed, given that they 
exceed existing goals by two or three times (Fuentes and 
Pexton, 1994). Additionally, one must remember that it takes 
four years to complete most officer accession programs (such 
as the military Academies or Reserve Officer Training Corps). 
Thus, the first officers under this plan will not be 
commissioned the fleet until around 1998 or 1999. 
Consequently, the Marine Corps is continuing with its 
previously announced "2015 Plan" which states that, by the 
year 2015, 5 percent of Marine Corps colonels will be black 
and 4.7 percent will be Hispanic. The year 2015 was selected 
11 
because it is the year when the newest second lieutenants will 
be senior enough to advance to the rank of colonel. (Fuentes 
and Pexton, 1994) 
Given, the importance of minority representation in 
national military policy and the ambitious goals set by the 
armed services, it is important to examine the implications of 
the current defense downsizing effort minority 
representation issues. The next section begins with a brief 
look at literature pertaining to organizational decline and 
downsizing strategies, and then considers the specific case of 
the Department of Defense drawdown as it affects both civilian 
and military personnel. 
B. DOWNSIZING 
l.. Strategies for the Private sector 
Increasing environmental constraints within the private 
sector, especially upon the larger entities, have resu l ted in 
the proliferation of research in the field of organizational 
decline (Kirby, 1993). Managers attempting to "retrench" 
their organizations have looked toward many possible options, 
including reconfiguring work processes, modifying 
communication and reporting channels, and, of course, 
decreasing the size of the workforce (Kirby, 1993). 
The research indicates that, in attempting to manage 
personnel reductions, a number of strategies are also 
available. The most common strategies were compiled in a 1992 
American Management Association survey. They include: hiring 
freezes, demotions or transfers, salary reductions or freezes, 
early retirement incentives, voluntary separation incentives, 
voluntary job sharing, shortened work week/days, and limited 
duration furloughs. The survey also indicated an increasing 
trend in the use of voluntary separation and early retirement 
incentives. (Skocik, 1993) 
The type of strategy implemented is itself dependent upon 
12 
many factors. The depth of cuts required and the lead time 
allowed to implement the reduction are important (Kirby, 
1993). as well as whether the company is facing a threat to 
its survival or is simply realigning (Perry. 1986). 
organizational philosophy I legal constraints, outside 
influences, and the impact of the downsizing actions on both 
stayers and leavers must also be considered (Skocik, 1993). 
Given these multiple considerations, it is not surprising 
that companies are turning more toward voluntary programs. 
These voluntary programs, also called "pull" strategies, 
produce less focused results, but are also less harsh than 
"push" strategies. Push strategies, such as personnel 
layoffs. are the most direct, and are potentially costly in 
terms of legal expenses (Felsenthal, 1994), employee morale, 
and organizational-societal relationships. (Kirby, 1993) 
The difficulty, however, with voluntary separation 
programs (as alluded to previously) is that the organization 
has little control over who accepts. Although firms may 
target certain subgroups of their payroll, outcomes are still 
largely unpredictable; and there is a continuing concern that 
high-quality people will leave in greater numbers, as well as 
concerns over demographic factors such as race, gender, and 
age. 
In summary, the literature indicates that organizations 
choosing to reduce personnel costs in response to 
environmental constraints have a number of options from which 
to choose. "Proactive" organizations afford themselves a 
wider range of options due to greater lead times and greater 
available resources. A downsizing effort that is managed 
poorly can result in negative consequences for both the firm 
and its employees. For this reason and others, there is an 
increasing emphasis on "pull" strategies or voluntary programs 
to accomplish reductions in personnel. 
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2. Tbe DoD Civilian Workforce Reduction 
Although the remainder of the federal civilian workforce 
increased by 104,000 employees (9 percent) from 19B2-1992, 
civilian workers in the Department of Defense (000) actually 
decreased by almost 22,000 employees, or about 2 percent, with 
the reductions occurring after 19B7 (congressional Budget 
Office, 1993). This drop in DoD's civilian employment from 
19B7-1992 is a result of a number of factors. The perceived 
reduction in threat after the end of the Cold War and 
dissolution of the soviet Union has led to a smaller military 
and, consequently, a smaller workload for civilian personnel. 
The decline in personnel has been accelerated by a number of 
management reforlils aimed at increasing efficiency and 
decreasing infrastructure. The Defense Base Realignment and 
Closure Commissions (BRAC) of 19BB, 1991, 1993, and 1995 offer 
evidence of such initiatives. (Congressional Budget Office, 
1993) 
The government has three standard approaches to reduce 
personnel: layoffs, hiring freezes, and early retirement 
programs. In recent years, Congress has also given 000 and 
other selected federal agencies the authority to offer cash 
incentives to employees who separate early. Although each 
approach to separating workers has its costs, analyses by t he 
congressional Budget Office (CBO) suggest that savings in pay 
and benefits far exceed costs no matter which strategy is 
employed, especially in the long term. Thus, the impact of 
non-cost considerations should be given as much weight as cost 
factors (Congressional Budget Office, 1993). These non-cost 
considerations, as detailed by CBO include: 
• insuring that the remaining workforce has the right mix 
of skills; 
• preventing growth in the average salary as a result of 
increases in the seniority 0:1' the workforce; 
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• maintaining the diversity of the work force (in terms 
of race and gender) ; and 
• preserving morale and productivity . 
Of part i cular interest to this thesis is the impact of the 
downsizing actions--layoffs, hiring freezes, early 
retirements, and separation incentives--on the diversity of 
the workforce. 
a . Layoffs 
Layoffs are generally the least desirable method of 
reducing the workforce due to the potential damage on employee 
morale and productivity. Agencies, however, must resort to 
layoffs when the required reductions are concentrated in 
particu lar organizations, skills, or geographic locations, or 
must be implemented within a short time period. Reductions at 
DaD, though, have generally been widespread with respect to 
the above factors, resulting in an low average annual rate of 
layoffs at less than 1 percent of the Workforce. 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1993) 
Blue collar workers represented about 30 percent of 
DaD's civilian workforce between 1990 and 1992, yet 
represented about 60 percent of the layoffs. The reason for 
the disproportionate reduction in blue-collar workers was that 
the decreases in workload were greatest in jObs--such as depot 
maintenance, supply activities and base facility upkeep and 
maintenance--where blue-collar work predominates. 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1993) 
Hen, in turn, were also disproportionate l y affected 
by the layoffs, because they held almost 90 percent of the 
blue-collar jabs. Hen represented 73 percent of persons who 
were laid off, while compriSing only 60 percent of the total 
workforce. Women, who accounted for 9 percent of the blue-
collar workforce, represented 13 percent of the blue-collar 
layoffs. Women's share in these layoffs was , however, 
proportional to their share of the workforce that was mast 
lS 
vulnerable to layoffs, persons with less than 12 years of 
service. At the same time, layoffs for women in the whi te-
collar force were proportional to female representation in 
that force. (Congressional Budget Office, 1993) 
CBO found that minorities not 
disproportionately affected by the 000 layoffs. In the blue-
collar force, for example, minorities represented 30 percent 
of the workforce and 26 percent of the layoffs. In addition, 
minorities accounted for the same proportion of layoffs in the 
white-collar force as their share of that sector . 
(congressional Budget Office, 1993) 
b. Hiring Freezes 
Since the drawdown began, 000 has used partial or 
targeted hiring freezes as the most common tool for reducing 
employment. Between January 1990 and October 1992, 000 was 
able to reduce employment by 3 to 4 percent each year, 
primarily by reliance on a partial hiring freeze. The main 
concern, however, when implementing a hiring freeze is that 
shortages in particular occupations will develop , as well as 
an increase in the average salary of a worker, especially if 
the hiring freeze is left in place over a long period. 
Nevertheless, CBO concluded that, with careful management, 
these mismatches between work requirements and available 
skills can be avoided by using different replacement rates for 
different occupations, or, in other words, by targeting the 
freeze. (Congressional Budget Office, 1993) 
An examination of the impacts of the hiring policies 
implemented at 000 during this period revealed little or no 
effect on the diversity of the workforce. From 1989 to 1992, 
qender and racial representation (as a percentage of the total 
population) did not change. Representation as a percentage of 
total accessions changed only slightly during the same period. 
The percentage of women accessed decreased from 50 to 49 
percent, while the percentage of minorities entering the 
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workforce increased from 32 to 34 percent. Effects on mora l e 
.... ere also assumed to be minimal, especially when compared with 
layoffs. (Congressional Budget Office, 1993) 
CBO did find, however, that average salary increased 
about 9 percentage points more than it would have without the 
freeze (11 percent versus 1.8 percent). This effect was 
attributed more to changes in occupational mix and grade 
structure than to the hiring restrictions. (congressional 
Budget Office, 1993) 
c . Early Ret:.ireJlent: 
CBO reported that early retirement packages could be 
used to reduce the size of the workforce by up to 2 percent 
annually_ However, if separation incentives are available or 
under consideration, early retirement without some incentive 
of its own would be unlikely to attract many takers. The low 
accepta nce rates for early retirement offers are explained by 
the financial penalty imposed by accepting such an offer, 
namely a smaller pension annuity. Most early-retirement-
eligible employees are protected from involuntary separation 
by their seniority, and consequently choose to continue 
service, ultimately increasing their pensions. (Congressional 
Budget Office, 1993) 
CBO found that the early retirement programs in 000 
h ad only a small effect on the diversity of the workforce. 
Men and non-minority workers were slightly more likely to 
accept, thus marginally increasing diversity. Men accounted 
for 73 percent of persons who accepted an "early out," 
compared with 70 percent of those eligible, and 60 percent of 
t he total workforce. Non-minorities took early retirement 
proportional to their ahare of the white-collar force and 
slightly higher than their share of the blUe-collar force. 
(congressional Budget Office, 1993) 
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d. separat;ion Incent;ives 
Separation incentives are seen as a means by which 
downsizing organizations can reduce the number of layoffs, 
ease job transition for separating workers, and restructure or 
reshape the remaining workforce. CBO, after examining the use 
of these incentives at the Postal Service and the Department 
of Defense, concluded that the "wise use" of separation 
incentives could help meet these goals. (Congressional Budget 
Office, 1993) 
Al though CBO did not comment on the impact of these 
incentives on the demographic profiles of the Postal Service 
and 000, it did report satisfactory effects on the turnover 
rates among retirement eligible workers, the abolishment of 
targeted jobs, and substantial cost savings as long as workers 
were not replaced or were replaced with less costly workers. 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1993) 
On the down side , CBO reported that incentives were 
likely to reduce normal turnover rates both before and while 
they are offered. Additionally, as the pool of eligibles 
shrinks, turnover would not increase as much as in the initial 
stages of the offerings. (Congressional Budget Office 1993) 
e. Lessons Learned 
CBO concluded that, with careful management, federal 
agencies can accomplish a drawdown of several percentage 
points annually, and simultaneously minimize layoffs by 
utilizing partial hiring freezes. If the drawdown is to be 
large or concentrated (in time or by occupation or geographic 
location), then separation incentives could be used to curta il 
the number of layoffs required. (congressional Budget Office, 
1993) 
3. Tbe lIilitary Dra.down 
As mentioned previously, the armed services have 
similarly faced the harsh fiscal realities of the late 198 0s 
and the 19906. Many factors, including the fall of the soviet 
Union and increasing budgetary pressures at hame, have 
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resulted in a force reduction of substantial proportions 
(Skocik, 1993). Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
reductions of uniformed personnel that have occurred in all 
services. The military's downsizing plans in 1 99 2 called for 
a red uction of 604, 000 (28 percent) active duty personnel 
between 1992 and 1997. The Navy and Marine Corps planned cuts 
of 17 and 20 percent, respectively, while the Army and Air 
Force aimed for endstrength cuts of 33 percent. In 1992 
alone, 153,000 positions were eliminated (Mehay, 1994). In 
attempting to achieve this large reduction in personnel within 
the planned timeframe, the services are employing a number of 
strategies similar to those used in the private sector and the 
federal civilian workforce. This section briefly describes 
the tools used by the services to reduce officer endstrength 
and comments on the strengths and limitations of such actions 
where appropri a te . 
a. Controlled Accessions 
Perhaps, the least disruptive and most preferred 
method of reducing manpower is to implement a full or partial 
hiring freeze and allow normal attrition to reduce numbers, as 
demonstrated with respect to the 000 civilian workforc e . 
Implementing such a policy in the military is, however, 
severely constrained by the nature of the internal labor 
market present in the services. with the exception of a 
relatively small number of scientists and professionals 
(doctors, dentists, lawyers, etc.), all new hiring is at the 
entry level and skilled workers are developed internally. A 
large reduction in accessions, could create an unbalanced 
personnel inventory, that, in turn, could have drastic 
implications for the future of the force in terms of 
experience, paygrade, and occupational mix (Mehay, 1994). For 
these reasons, the services have been able to rely on reduced 
accessions only in a limited manner to help meet officer 
endstrength goals throughout the drawdown. 
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b. Reductions in Force 
Perhaps the quickest, though least desirable, way to 
reduce the military is through a reduction-in-force (RIF). A 
RIF occurs when non-vested careerists (those with greater than 
six years of service), otherwise eligible to serve until 
retirement, are involuntarily separated. The usual procedure 
for implementing a RIF is a performance-based selection board. 
The board is given a quota and then selects the lowest 
performers from the eligible population (set by the services) 
for separation. RIFs are generally viewed as a last resort, 
due to the perception of breaking implicit long-term contracts 
with careerists and the subsequent adverse effects on morale 
or the military's reputation as an employer. (Mehay, 1994) 
The Navy, which f a ced the lowest number of personnel 
cuts, has been able to avoid RIFs per se. The Navy has, 
however, relied on Involuntary Releases from Active Duty 
(IRAOs). IRADs are technically not the same as RIFs in that 
they pertain to active duty reservists, who, by nature of 
their reserve status are not considered career personnel, eve n 
though they may have more than six years of active duty 
service. 
Additionally, the services have greatly restricted 
the number of reservists allowed to augment to the Regular 
status, as well as commissioning all new officers, even those 
from the Academies and ROTC scholarship programs, into the 
The purpose of these policies is, of course, to 
control entry into the "career force," and therefore reduce 
the possible need for a true RIF in the future. 
c. Barly Retireaent 
The services have additionally relied on two early 
retirement programs, one voluntary and one involuntary, to 
help meet officer endstrength throughout the drawdown period. 
The involuntary program is known as the Selective Early 
Retirement (SER). while the voluntary program is known as 
Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA). 
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The SER program is very similar in procedure to a 
RIF. In this case, however, the services designate SER zones 
for personnel \oIho are (or are close to) retirement eligibility 
(20 years of service) . A SER board then meets and decides 
which officers will be forced to retire, based again on quotas 
set by the individual services. The SER, like the RIF, is one 
of the most difficult aspects of the drawdown (Chief of Naval 
operations, 1994b). For this reason, the military has been 
given the authority to offer an early retirement incentive. 
Congress has authorized TERA for service use through 
September 1999. Also known as the IS-year retirement, TERA 
offers an early retirement option at a somewhat reduced 
monthly stipend to eligible members prior to completing 20 
years of service. Eligibility is extended to active duty 
officers with at least 15 years of active service during the 
fiscal year of the program offering. TERA is not an 
entitlement, and, consequently, all who apply may not be 
approved. In this manner, the services are able to target the 
occupational specialties and years-of-service categories they 
wish to reduce within the officer inventory. Persons who 
retire under TERA receive the same retired pay as do those 
under the 20-year retirement except for a reduction of 1/12th 
percent for each month less than 20 years of service. Other 
benefits under TERA remain essentially unchanged from regular 
retirement. (Chief on Naval operations, 1994c) 
d. separation Incentives 
In addition to the early retirement programs 
mentioned above, 000 has been authorized by Congress to offer 
separation bonuses to career personnel to induce voluntary 
resignation prior to retirement eligibility (Mehay 1994). The 
program, entitled the Voluntary separation Incentive/special 
Separation Bonus (VSI/SSB), has two options and is offered on 
a selective basis to shape the structure of specific 
occupational specialties or communities, while still reducing 
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end-strength. Although the program is authorized through 
September 1999, it is used on an "as needed" basis by the 
services, and mayor may not be offered to the same or 
additional communities in subsequent years. (Chief of Naval 
operations, 1994a) 
Under the VSI option, separating members are paid an 
annual amount equal to 2 . 5 percent times their final monthly 
base pay multiplied by 12 times their years of service. 
Annual payments commence on separation from active duty and 
continue on each anniversary for a period equal to twice the 
number of years of active service. For example, an 0-3 with 
8 years of service would receive $7,256 dollars (less taxes) 
upon separation and for the next 15 years, for a total of 
$116,110. (Chief of Naval operations, 1994a) 
The SSB is a lump-sum payment equal to 15 percent 
times the final monthly base pay multiplied by 12 times the 
years of service. For example, an 0-3 with 8 years of service 
would receive $43,541 upon separation. It should be noted 
that neither VSI nor SSB is a retirement plan and, 
consequently, the separating member does not receive 
commissary or exchange privileges, or medical benefits. 
Members separating must accept appointment in the Ready 
Reserve, three years for SSB recipients, and for the duration 
of payments for those accepting VSI. (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 1994a) 
As can be seen, the VSI/SSB program is an excellent 
tool for military manpower managers to ensure the right mix of 
personnel with respect to paygrade, tenure, and occupation, 
while drawing down the force and minimizing RIFs. This tool, 
along with the early retirement programs and controlled 
accessions, are the primary means by which the military has 
implemented its massive downsizing in the officer corps. One 
must remember, however, that the threat of RIF, real or 
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perceived, is still lurking behind all efforts to reduce the 
force. 
C. RBTBNTIOII' THEORY AND BEHAVIOR 
1. Introduotion 
Before attempting to assess the impact of drawdown 
actions on the retention of minority officers, it is important 
to examine the theoretical aspects of job separation. This 
section begins with a review of the firm-specific h Uman 
capital and the job-matching theories of job separation. The 
Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model is also discussed 
since it is very pertinent to this research, especially when 
assessing the impact of monetary incentives. The section 
concludes with the results of previous studies in the areas of 
retention and separation incentives. 
This study is complicated by the fact that officer 
retention is very different from enlisted retention. Enlisted 
members are at all times serving under an explicit contract. 
Upon expiration of their contract, they must either reenlist 
(sign another contract) or separate. Although most, if not 
all, officers have some minimum service obligation upon 
commissioning, they are not required to "reenlist" at the end 
of that obligation. Officers, then, serve by virtue of their 
commission and remain on active duty until they resign or are 
asked to leave the service. Additional obligations may be 
incurred, however, for such things as government-sponsored 
postgraduate education and advanced technical training. 
Officers wishing to leave the service must file a "Letter of 
Intent" (to resign) through their commanding officer to the 
service secretary. The date at which the officer leaves the 
service is then determined by the desires of the individual, 
the operational needs of the unit to which he or she is 
attached, and the needs of the service . Often, an officer 
wishing to separate at the end of his or her initial 
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obligation will remain in service until the end of a current 
tour, even if that date occurs after the obligated date of 
service. For these reasons, retention decisions for officers 
do not generally occur at a set point in time, as with a 
first-, second-, or third-term enlistment contract for an 
enlisted member. This lack of a well-defined decision point 
makes analysis difficult, especially in the aggregate. In 
fact, the data used for this research indicate, that, at least 
at the 000 level, records of service obligations for 
individual officers are not reliable. For these reasons, and 
perhaps also due to the relative size of the enlisted force, 
most retention research has been in the domain of 
reenl istment. 
2. Theorie. of Jo~ separation 
The basic, underlying premise of the economic models of 
job separation is that when either an employer or employee 
anticipates that a separation will enhance his or her well-
being, the employee separates. Thus, in the case of the 
employee , if the net present value of benefits, both pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary, of the current job is less than those of an 
alternative job, then he or she will separate (Buddin, 1984). 
In the military context, retention usually refers to a 
voluntary decision, and attrition refers to an inVoluntary 
separation before completing one's obligation; however, the 
distinction between the two may have little theoretical or 
empirical importance. The theoretical differences are 
ambiguous, and the empirical ones are complicated by service 
policies that, in principle, prevent "quitting" before the end 
of a service obl igation. A dissatisfied member may, 
nevertheless, set up conditions that lead to separation, 
making it difficult to determine the party initiating the 
separation. (Buddin, 1994) 
Because, the initial "contracts" were satisfactory to 
both the employer and employee, separation (either by quitting 
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or firing) implies that 50me aspect has become unsatisfactory. 
The first two models of job separation discussed below, differ 
1n their explanation of the changes that induce the 
d issatisfaction. The first is the firm-specific human capital 
model, and the second is the job-matching model. (Buddin, 
1994) 
4. Fir-.-specific Human capital lIode1 
Firm-specific human capital models assume that, 
although /!In employee may learn many skills from job 
experience, 50llle special skills (firm-specific) that are not 
transferable to other jobs are also learned. The acquisition 
of these firm-specific skills is cumulative over time; 
therefore, one would expect the probability of separation to 
decrease with tenure. Additionally, the model suggests that 
separation rates are also a function of individual and finn 
characteristics, as well as investments in firm-specific human 
capital. Thus, factors such as education, age, race, family 
status, health, experience, unemployment history, and indUs t ry 
should be considered when examining job separations (Buddin, 
1984). Ehrenberg and Smith (1994) also suggest that gender, 
firm-size, wage effects, and the cyclical changes in the 
economy are important to the firm-specific human capital 
theory. 
Buddin (1984) summarizes with three hypotheses 
concerning job separations that emerge from the firm-specific 
human capital model: 
• separation rates will decline with tenure; 
• separation rates will be inversely related to 
individual characteristics (education, age, race, 
health, experience, etc.) that !!Ire complementary with 
investment in firm-specific hwnan capital; and 
• indicators of job JIIIobility will be positively 
correlated with separation probability. 
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b. Job-Hatching Hodel 
The basic premise behind the job-matching models of 
job separations is that individuals and firms enter into 
employment agreements with imperfect information. As new 
information is made available, each party reassesses the 
agreement and, if it becomes unsatisfactory the result is a 
wage adjUstment, promotion, or separation. (Buddin, 1984) 
Job-matching models may be divided into two 
categories based upon the source of uncertainty. The 
"experience" model theorizes that, through job experience, the 
individual learns more about his or her own skill. As new 
information is obtained, then the initial employment contract 
is reevaluated . If found to be unsatisfactory, then a change 
in employment may result. (Buddin, 1984) 
"Search" models, on the other hand, assume that 
uncertainty stems from imperfect information pertaining to 
alternative jobs and not the current one. As the employee 
receives information concerning alternative employment 
opportunities, they may decide that they are better suited for 
employment elsewhere . Experience models are generally more 
appropriate for explaining early military separations 
(attrition), while the search models are probably more 
appropriate for later job separations (non-reenlistment). 
This is due to the fact that the individual has had more time 
to acquire general skills that may enhance employment 
opportunities in the civilian sector. (Buddin, 1984) 
Buddin (1984) summarizes three predictions from the 
job-matching models with three hypotheses: 
• job separations are likely to occur at low levels of 
tenure; 
• the greater the uncertainty about the initial 
employment agreement, the greater the probability of a 
mismatch; and 
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• the probability of mismatch and subsequent probability 
of separation are positively related to the ease of 
future separations as perceived at hiring. 
c. Annualized Cost of Leaving Models 
cost-of-Ieaving models are useful when attempting to 
assess the impacts of monetary incentives--such as changes in 
retirement eligibility or voluntary separation incentives--on 
personnel retention. These models presume that the decision 
made by an individual to leave the military is dependent upon 
the net present values of the expected benefits, both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary, of the two alternative sources of 
employment (Warner and Goldberg, 1984). The Annualized Cost 
of Leaving (ACOL) model, developed by Nelson and Warner, 
provide two major contributions to the study of retention 
decisions. First it provides a basis for determining the 
horizon over which to compare military and civilian pay; 
second, it relates the estimated retention equation more 
directly to the concept that individuals tend to act in their 
own best interest, or maximize utility. (Hogan and Black, 
1991) 
One approach to using this model is to decompose the cost 
of leaving into its component parts: military pay, civilian 
pay, and, if present, a separation bonus. Thus, in its 
simplest form the model is specified as: 
ACOL = M - (C + B) 
where M is the discounted expected stream of military 
compensation, C is the discounted expected of civilian 
compensation, and B is the effect of the bonus. The bonus in 
this case is added to the civilian alternative, since it is a 
&eparation bonus, increasing the expected stream of civilian 
compensation. If the value of ACOL is positiVe, the member 
will stay; if it is negative, he or she will separate. 
(Skocik, 1993) 
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The perceived values of each income stream are, in turn, 
affected by personal discount rates. A variety of factors, 
including education, gender, race, age, probability of 
promotion, and probability of retirement, determine personal 
discount rates. These factors may then be useful for 
predicting acceptance of a separation incentive or early 
retirement program. For a fuller discussion of the ACOL 
model, see Warner and Goldberg (1984) or Hogan and Black 
(1991) . 
3. Previous aeteatioa aad .eparatioa .IDceDtive Studies 
As mentioned previously, the vast majority of retention 
literature pertains to the enlisted force, with most research 
concentrating on the first reenlistment decision. By and 
large, the results of these studies confirm the theoretical 
models presented above. As an example, cymrot (1987) examined 
the i mpact of selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) on 
retention in the Marine Corps. He found that, not only did 
bonuses significantly increase retention, but that 
reenlistment and extensions also increased with the magnitude 
of the bonus multiplier. The next strongest factor increasing 
retention was rank, indicating perhaps the effect of higher 
pay and the development of firm-specific human capital. 
A number of studies have recently examined the effects of 
VSI/SSB on the enlisted force. Kirby (1993) found that in a 
fiscal 1992 Navy program, all minorities were significantly 
less likely to accept the bonus. Other important variables 
included family status, occupational specialty, length of 
service, paygrade, and years left on enlistment contract. 
Giarrbzo (1993) and Skocik (1993) confirmed the impacts of 
racial background in A subsequent (fiscal 1993) Navy offering 
of VSI/SSB. An analysis of Army and Air Force enlisted 
personnel indicated that non-minorities were also more likely 
to accept VSI/SSB in those services (Beland and Collage, 
1992) . 
28 
In all of these studies it is important to note that the 
vast majority of program participants (nearly 85 percent of 
takers in the fiscal 1992 Navy offering) elected the lump-sum 
bonus over the annul ty. This suggests that the personal 
discount rates for these enlisted populations may be much 
higher than previously assumed. For example, using a discount 
rate of 7 percent, the present value of VSI for an E-5 with 
twelve years of service 1s $61,211, compared with $32,025 for 
SSB. At an 18 percent discount rate, the net present value of 
VSI is only $29,091, compared with the same amount for SSB. 
(Mehay, 1994) 
Of the existing studies on officer retention, many have 
used survey data in an attempt to ascertain the key factors in 
an officer's decision to remain on active duty. A 1983 Marine 
Corps study reported that the two factors inflUencing 
retention the most, regardless of race, were job satisfaction 
and the treatment of the officer as an individUal. 
Additionally, the study reported that racial discrimination 
was not a major factor; and that the lack of career and 
performance counseling. as well as the performance evaluation 
system, may be more detrimental to black off icers "who because 
of educational and/or cultural deprivation, are 'slow 
starters' in their Marine Corps career." (Dubois, 1983) 
Intrinsic factors, such as job satisfaction and 
perceptions of promotion probability, appeared to be more 
important than extrinsic factors in career decisions among 
Army and Marine Corps personnel in an analysis of the 1985 000 
Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel (Steele, 1987). An 
examination of the same data for Air Force officers reported, 
SUrprisingly, that officers with more experience were lIIore 
likely to leave (Payne, 1988). Thielmann (1990) reported that 
lIIinority officers stay at higher rates that non-minorities, 
based upon his analysis of the 1985 000 survey, restricting 
his analysis to Marine Corps officers. 
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A 1992 study of the effects of the downsizing on 
personnel quality, using data from the VSI/SSB programs, found 
that white officers were less likely to separate in the Army 
and Air Force. The study also concluded that, as years of 
education increased, the probability of separation increased. 
other significant variables were commissioning source, marital 
status, number of dependents, and gender. (Beland and Collage, 
1992) 
D. 8DJOlARY 
There are at least three broad areas of research that 
pertain to this thesis. First, the literature highlights the 
increasing importance of minority representation in all 
aspects of the military manpower system, including accession, 
promotion, attrition, and retention. The dilemma faced by 
manpower officials in attempting to staff a representative 
officer corps while, at the same time maintaining current 
measures of quality and force effectiveness, seems to be an 
ever-present theme. 
Second, the field of organizational decline and personnel 
downsizing is important to the time period (1987 through 1994) 
examined by this research effort. This chapter presented the 
initiatives used for accomplishing personnel drawdowns in the 
private sector, federal civilian workforce, and the military. 
It is apparent that the current trend is to utilize less 
painful, voluntary strategies to reduce the workforce, rather 
than resort to layoffs or involuntary RIFs. The use of "pull" 
strategies to meet endstrength, however, makes it difficult 
for managers to control who will accept the separation 
incentives, therefore increasing concern over the possible 
changes to the demographic make-up of the workforce. 
Finally, retention behavior and its underlying economic 
theories are pertinent to this research as attempts are made 
to explain separation behavior. The firm-specific human 
cap! tal, job-matching, and ACOL models were examined in this 
chapter to help understand the importance of monetary factors, 
as well as individual and firm characteristics, in the 
retention decision. These theories are to specify the 
empirical models of retention in the present study. 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
TO meet the research objectives outlined in Chapter I, 
the statistical analysis in this thesis is carried out in 
three parts. The first part consists of a cross-sectional 
analysis of end-ot-year extracts from the Officer Master File 
covering fiscal 1987 through 1994, inclusive. These end-of-
year extracts provide a snapshot of the officer corps on the 
last day of the fiscal year and are useful in determining 
trends in minority representation during the 1987-1994 period 
examined. The second part consists of a longitudinal analysis 
of entry cohorts for four years; officers commissioned in 
1977, 1980, 1983, and 1987. These cohort files are useful for 
modeling separation behavior and making comparisons across 
years when differing drawdown policies were in effect. The 
final part of this analysis consists of an examination of 
minority status on the decision to accept the VSI/SSB 
incentive offerings in the Air Force in fiscal 1992 and 1993, 
and in the Navy in fiscal 1993. This chapter describes the 
data and methodology used for the cross-sectional and 
longitudinal analyses. The data, methodology, and results of 
the VSI/SSB analysis are presented in Chapter V. All data 
were files provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center, 
Monterey, CA . 
A. CROSS-SECnONAL ANALYSIS 
1. I'requancy Distributions and Cross-Tabulation. 
Utilizing the DMDC cross-sectional data files for the 
years 1987 through 1994, a number of frequency distributions 
and cross-tabulations of minority status with other relevant 
dimensions such as service, paygrade, and occupation were 
generated and examined. Selected results are discussed in 
Chapter IV and tables are presented in Appendix A. Two 
restrictions were placed on the officer samples before 
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generating the frequency tables . First, Warrant Officers were 
omitted from the analysis because of extreme differences 
a cross services and between commissioned officers in 
qualifications, accession, and utiliZation. Second, 
observations were omitted when gender was not identifiable 
within the data. Observations with an undetermined racial 
background were left in the data set and cross-tabulated as a 
separate "unknown" category. Table I below indicates the 
total number of observations remaining after these 
restrictions were imposed on the samples for each of the eight 
years examined. 
Table 1. ObserVations in Cross-Sectional Analysis, by 
Fiscal 'tear, 1987-1994 
'tear Number of Year Number of 
Observations Observations 
1987 288,300 1991 271,050 
1988 285,431 1992 255,240 
1989 283,531 1993 239,176 
1990 277,224 1994 228,495 
2. Kinority st.tu.~ .ank, and Serviee 
Appendix Tables AI-A16 depict the trend in minority 
officer representation for each service and total DoD for 1987 
through 1994. All officers 0-1 through 0-10 are presented 
first, followed by separate tables for 0-4s, 0-6s, and flag or 
general officers. Minorities are divided into four 
categories! black, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, and all 
other minorities (including American Indian/Eskimo) . These 
race and ethnicity categories are used throughout this 
analysis. 
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3. .inority Statu., occupation, all.4 Service 
Previous research has indicated that minorities are not 
proportionally represented across occupations (Eitelberg, 
1988). Appendix Tables A17-A25 present black representation 
in each service and total 000 for each of the nine general 
occupational categories delineated for officers in the 000 
occupational Conversion Index, dated September 1993. Table 2 
below describes these occupational categories. 
Table 2. 000 occupational Categories 
Number 000 occupational Category 
General Officers and Executives, N.E.C. 
Tactical operations Officers 
Intelligence Officers 
Engineering and Maintenance Officers 
scientists and Professionals 
Health Care Officers 
Administrators 
supply, Procurement, and Allied Officers 
Non-Occupational Officers 
Source: 000 1312.1-1 Occupat10na Convers1on Index 
Realizing that occupation plays such an important role when 
discussing racial representation in the military, it is 
important to examine the trends in the occupational mix 
throughout the downsizing period. Presumably, if jObS within 
certain occupations are eliminated faster than others, 
minorities may be disproportionately affected due to 
differences in occupational representation. Appendix Tables 
A26-A30 depict the trends in occupational mix for 000 and each 
lIervice, using the occupational categories outlined in Table 
2. The base year for all occupational comparisons is 1988, 
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due to apparent discrepancies in the data for 1987 with 
respect to occupation. 
B. LOHGITUDIHAL Ali'ALYSIS 
In the second part of the analysis in this thesis, four 
entering cohorts--1977, 1980, 1983, and 1987--were used to 
model separation behavior both prior to and during the 
drawdown. The cohorts included officers who were commissioned 
as O-ls between october 1st and September 30th of the years 
examined. As mentioned in Chapter II, since there is little 
difference theoretically and empirically between employees who 
"quitn and employees who are "fired," no distinction was made 
between officers who left voluntarily, and those who left 
involuntarily. 
Before models could be developed and interpreted, a 
significant problem was encountered in identifying the proper 
time horizon (5) to examine with respect to probability of 
separation . As mentioned in Chapter II, officers do not have 
an explicit "enlistment" contract that would force a decision 
point at the expiration of that contract. Consequently, the 
services use the expiration of minimum service requirement 
(MSR) as a basis for measuring retention. The minimum service 
data in the DMDC files, however, proved to be unreliable . 
Since the multivariate models appeared to be sensitive to the 
selected time horizon over which retention is measured, it was 
necessary to develop some logical framework for choosing t h e 
time period for the retention decision. The sections below 
describe the methodology used to determine appropriate time 
horizons, and also the multivariate models used to analyze 
separation behavior. 
1. Id.ntifioation of Separation Pba ••• 
In attempting to identify appropriate time horizons for 
analysis, the separation probability density function ("death" 
or "non-survival" density function) for each year-group was 
plotted, by service. These plots, representing the 
probability that a randomly selected individual will separate 
at any given time etl, are presented in Appendix B (Figures 1-
16) • 
Examination of these probability density functions, 
revealed that officer separation could be divided into 
distinct career phases. The first phase generally occurs 
between zero and three years of service and is called the 
attrition phase. The second phase falls between three and 
approximately 10-11 years of service and is called the early 
leave decision phase. It is in this phase that the minimum 
service requirements expire, as evidenced by increased 
separation probability at four, five, and six years of 
commissioned service . The next phase appears to be much 
narrower in time and falls between 10-14, years of service 
depending upon branch. It is presumed that this phase is 
highly correlated with promotion to 0-4. Evidence for this 
can be found in that the Navy career decision phase falls 
between 9 and 12 years of service, earlier than in the Army 
and Marine Corps. The Navy has also historically promoted 
officers to 0-4 sooner than the Army and the Marine Corps. 
The fourth phase, termed the late leave decision phase, 
coincides with the remainder of an officer's career after the 
career decision phase. In the 1977 cohort, an additional 
phase was identified after 15 years of service and is 
associated .... ith the I5-year retirement or TERA program . For 
simplicity, these phases are numbered and I through V, 
according to Table 3 below, and subsequently referred to by 
number. 
The figures presented in Appendix B also indicate which 
of these phases fell partially or completely within the 
drawdown years. For the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, 
1988 was used as the beginning of the drawdown period. For 
the Navy, 1989 was used because the Navy began its downsizing 
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later than the other services. This delineation of pre-
dra1oldown and dra1old01oln years is useful in comparing the 
separation phases bet10leen year groups, 10Ihen differing policies 
and programs 10Iere in effect. The sections bel010l briefly 
describe the separation probability density functions for each 
service. 
a. .ar.y Separation Phases 
Figures 1-4 in Appendix B present the separation 
probability density functions for the four Army cohorts . In 
the 1977 Army cohort, the attrition phase was abbreviated to 
less than t1ol0 years, compared with approximately three years 
for the other cohorts. The career decision phase appeared to 
begin around 11 years of commissioned service for those 
cohorts where this phase was observable. A period of slightly 
increased separation probability is observed after 15 years of 
service in the 1977 cohort and is presumably correlated 10Iith 
the 15-year retirement. 







Early Leave Decision 
Career Decision 
Late Leave Decision 
Early Retirement Window 
1977 Cohort only 
b. Navy Separation PluJses 
Figures 5-8 in Appendix B depict the separation 
probabilities for the four entering Navy cohorts. The 
patterns here are similar to those of the Army, with some 
notable exceptions. The 1977 Navy attrition phase lasted 
until the third year of service, instead of only two years. 
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The career decision phase for Navy officers appears to begin 
just prior to the tenth year of service, supporting the notion 
that this phase is closely tied with promotion to 0-4. The 
early retirement phase is much more accentuated in the 1977 
Navy cohort, especially around 17-18 years of service. 
c. Air Force separation Plutses 
Figures 9-12 in Appendix B present the separation 
probability density functions for the Air Force officer 
cohorts. These plots are similar to the Navy plots described 
above. Notably different is the probability of separation at 
the four-year point relative to separation later in the early 
decision phase. The Air Force seemed to experience more 
disruption of the "normal" separation pattern, through the 
drawdown, than was witnessed in the ArIllY and Navy, making it 
difficult to identify the career decision phase in the 1 98 3 
cohort. In the 1977 and 1980 cohorts the career decision 
phase appeared to begin at around to ten years of service; in 
the 1983 cohort, however, it appeared to occur earlier, at 
approximately nine years. Due to this finding, an additional 
late decision phase was model for the 1983 Air Force cohort. 
d. Harine Corps Separation Phases 
Figures 13-16 in Appendix B present the separation 
probability density functions for the Marine cohorts. The 
most significant differences between these cohorts and those 
of the other services are the very low probabilities of 
separating in the attrition phase and the timing of the career 
decision phase. The career decision phase did not begin until 
approximately 12 years of service for the 1977 and 1980 Marine 
year groups. Additionally, there was no discernible increase 
in separation probability during the ear l y retirement window 
identified in the other services. 
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:2:. lIultivariat. Separation lIodelli 
Once the phases of separation were identif ied for each 
cohort by service, multivariate models were developed and 
estimated for each phase independent of other phases. That 
is, separation behavior was modeled for each phase conditional 
upon having survived to the beginning of the phase being 
modeled. Modeling in this way eliminates the cumulative 
effects of separation in previous phases. Once the models 
were estimated, comparisons were made between like phases that 
occurred before the drawdown with those that occurred during 
the drawdown. 
Log-likelihood ratio tests were conducted to determine if 
behavior in the pre-drawdown phases were statistically 
different from behavior in that in the drawdown phases. In 
every case, the tests indicated that the models of the pre-
drawdown phases were significantly different from those 
estimated during the drawdown. This fact does not directly 
prove that drawdown policies were the cause of differences in 
separation behavior, only that observed behavior was 
statistically different. 
Two types of models were used to assess the impact of 
personal characteristics on separation probability: a log-
l inear survival model and a "logit" regression model. The 
sections below describe the attributes of these models, 
well as the dependent and explanatory variables used. 
a. Log-Linear Survival Hodel 
The log-linear survival regression model assumes 
that the natural logarithm of survival time (t), in this case, 
months of commissioned service until separation , is a linear 
function of the explanatory variables. However, due to the 
presence of right-censored observations and the probability 
that l oq (t) is not normally distributed, ordinary-least-
squares regression techniques are inappropriate. For these 
reasons, an accelerated life model employing the method of 
maximum likelihood is used to obtain the parameter estimates. 
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Additionally, a Weibull distribution of log(t) is assumed. 
This assumption can be checked by examining the plot of the 
10g(-10g S(t)) of the sample, where Set) is the survival 
function. If this plot is approximately linear, then the 
Weibull distribution can be assumed. (Afifi and Clark, 1990) 
Thus, for these separation models the log of months of 
commissioned service until separation was regressed on the 
explanatory variables. In the samples used for this analysis, 
the Weibull distribution is appropriate. Right censored 
observations, those officers surviving past the end of the 
phase in question, are accounted for. The parameter estimate 
obtained by this model can be directly interpreted as a 
proportional or relative change in months of commissioned 
service until separation, given an absolute change in the 
explanatory variable, holding other variables constant. By 
multiplying the parameter estimate by 100, the percentage 
change in the dependent variable, holding other explanatory 
variables constant, is obtained (Gujarati, 1988) . The 
explanatory variables used in these models are described in 
section c, below. 
b. Non-Linear Logit Regression Ifodel 
A second method of modeling separation behavior is 
simply to divide the observations into two categories: those 
who separated during a given career phase and those who did 
not. When the dependent variable is specified in this manner, 
logit regression is appropriate. The basic assumption in this 
technique is that the log (odds) of belonging to a population 
is related to the explanatory variables. No assumptions are 
made regarding the distribution of the explanatory variables, 
allowing these to be either discrete or continuous (Afifi and 
Clark, 1990). Thus, in terms of probability of separating, 
the logi t model as: 
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Separation Probability" l+exp( (l3o~f3iX.1+€J» 
where the l3's are the logit parameter estimates, the Xi'S are 
the explanatory variables, and € i is the stochastic error 
term. The parameter estimates are interpreted as the change 
in the log (of the odds) of the dependent variable, given a 
one-unit change in the dependent variable, holding all other 
explanatory variables constant. In the models presented in 
Appendix C, this change in the log(of the odds) is converted 
to an absolute change in probability as well as a percentage 
change in probability. section c below describes the 
explanatory variables used with the logistic regression 
models. 
c. Krplanatory Variables for separation lIodels 
For purposes of comparison, the same specification 
of explanatory variables was used, Where possible, in all 
models. Table 4, below, lists and briefly describes the 
variables used. 
The minority variables, BLACK, HISPANIC, OTHMINOR, and 
ASIAN/PI are of primary interest to this analysis. There are 
two opposite a priori hypotheses in relation to the impact of 
minority status on separation behavior. The first is that the 
military is generally perceived to have a better equal 
opportunity atmosphere and to offer better employment 
opportunities and pay than the civilian sector; and, 
consequently, minorities would be less likely leave (as is 
generally thought to be the case in the enlisted ranks). The 
alternative hypothesis is that these highly-qualified (college 
graduate) minorities are in high demand in the civilian 
sector, thus making them more likely to leave the m.ilitary, 
especially if they perceive that long-term. 
opportunities in the military are not as favorable as they m.ay 
have believed upon being commissioned. 
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The FEMALE variable is included to capture differences in 
separation behavior between genders. Generally, women are 
expected to have higher turnover rates than men (Ehrenberg and 
Smith, 1994) and are thus expected to have a higher 
probability of separation in this analysi s , at least in t h e 
early career phases. The NUHDEPS variable is included to 
capture the risk aversion and loW'er job mobility expected of 
officers with larger families. Thus, this variable is 
expected to decrease the probability of separation . 
Table 4. Description of Explanatory Variables 
Variable Description 
BLACK coded 1 if black, 0 otherwise 
HISPANIC coded 1 if Hispanic, 0 otherwise 
OTHHINOR coded 1 if Other minority, 0 otherwise 
ASIAN/PI coded 1 if Asian/Pacific Islander, 0 otherwise 
FEMALE coded 1 if female, 0 if male 
NUHDEPS continuous variable for number of dependents 
ENLSVC coded 1 if prior enlisted service, 0 otherwise 
ENTRYAGE continuous variable for age at service entry 
ACAD coded 1 if an academy graduate, 0 otherwise, 
POSTGRAD coded 1 if held a Master's or higher degree, 0 
otherwise 
NODEG coded 1 if no college degree, 0 otherwise 
OPERATNL coded 1 if a Tactical operations Officer, 0 
otherwise 
Economic theory implies that older persons have .ore 
experience and are thus more likely to obtain a job-match when 
seeking employment. Thus, the ENTRYAGE variable is expected 
to decrease the probability of separation. In a study of 
enlisted attrition, however, Buddin (1984) found the opposite, 
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and argued that the military may tend to attract "labor market 
lemons," thus increasing separation rates for older persons. 
The ENLSVC variable is expected to have a negative impact 
on separation in earlier years, because persons with prior 
enlisted service have demonstrated a propensity for military 
service and have already accumulated time toward retirement. 
In later years, they are expected to leave at higher rates as 
they reach retirement eligibility sooner than their peers 
without prior service. 
Similarly, academy graduates are predicted to stay longer 
than those from other cOJlUllissioning sources due to a 
demonstrated higher propensity for military service, as well 
as the acculturation received during their tenure at the 
academy. The ACAD variable, then, should show a decrease in 
separation probability. 
Two education variables are included, POSTGRAD and NODEG. 
The a priori hypothesis concerning these variables is that 
education enhances the attainment of firm-specific human 
capital, thus decreasing turnover rates. NODEG, then, should 
increase separation, while POSTGRAD would decrease separation 
relative to those with only an undergraduate degree . 
The final variable, OPERATNL, captures the differences 
between those categorized as Tactical Operations Officers and 
all others. A priori assumptions concerning this variable are 
somewhat mixed, and may vary among services . For example, 
inclusion into this category in the Navy would infer a qreater 
time spent on sea duty, which might increase separation rates. 
At the same time, this occupational qroup might have greater 
(or lesser) promotion opportunities which, presumably, affect 
separation decisions. 
ThUS, with all these variables included, the dependent 
variables described in above sections, are considered to be 
related to race, gender, number of dependents, prior enlisted 
service, age at entry, source of cOJlUllission, education, and 
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occupation. The base case for these models would then be a 
white, male, non-prior service, non-academy graduate, with an 
undergraduate degree (only), and of any occupation except 
Tactical operations. 
This chapter has outlined the methodology used to examine 
minority officer retention/separation throughout the draw-down. 





This chapter discusses the results of the cross-sectional 
and longitudinal analyses described in Chapter III. The 
results from the VSI/SSB models are contained in Chapter V. 
A. CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Appendix A presents selected results from the various 
cross-tabulations that examine trends in minority officer 
representation throughout the drawdown. Minority 
representation for paygrades 0-1 through 0-10 can be found in 
Appendix Tables AI-A4. Appendix Tables A5-A16 present 
representation figures for 0-48, 0-65, and Flag/General 
officers, separately. Black officer representation by 
occupation is presented in Appendix Tables A17-A25, while 
Tables A26-A30 show trends in occupational mix by service. 
The contents of these tables are discussed below. 
1. Rank and Repr ••• ntation 
For paygrades 0-1 through 0-10, modest gains in 
representation were seen for minority groups with only a few 
exceptions. DoD-wide, black officer representation increased 
from 6.5 to 7.2 percent, with the Navy showing the largest 
percentage point increase. The Navy was also the only service 
to actually increase the number of black officers through the 
drawdown, but still has one of the lowest proportions at 4.9 
percent. Hispanic representation increased from 1.7 to 2.6 
percent DoD-wide, with all services showing a percentage point 
increase except the Air Force, where Hispanic representation 
remained virtually constant. Asian/Pacific Islander 
representation increased from 1.4 to 2.1 percent, while all 
other minority groups combined increased slightly from 1.2 to 
1.6 percent DoD-wide. 
Among black 0-4S, the Army and Air Force showed dramatic 
increases of 4.8 and 3.4 percentage points, respectively. The 
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Navy posted a much more modest gain of 0.6 percentage points, 
while the Marine Corps remained constant. Hispanic 0-4 
representation increased from approximately 1.0 to 1.5 
percentage pOints across all services, and was at 2.6 percent 
DoD-wide at the end of 1994. Asian/Pacific Islander 0-4 
representation increased from 1. 0 to 1. 8 percent, while all 
other minorities showed a slight increase of 0.2 percentage 
points DoD-wide. 
Among 0-6s and flag or general officers, the increases in 
minority representation were much smaller. The Marine Corps 
posted a significant increase in black 0-6s of 1 . 8 percentage 
points. The Air Force had the largest increases in 
representation among general officers of 1 . 8 percentage points 
for blacks, 1.4 percentage points for Hispanics, and 1.7 
percentage points for the other minority category. 
2. Black Officer. and Occupation 
Given the apparent importance of occupational assignment 
in matters of representation, the occupational distribution of 
the largest minority group, blacks, was examined through the 
drawdown. Appendix Tables A17 through A25 show the number and 
percentage of blacks wi thin the nine 000 occupational 
categories described in Chapter III. Although there are large 
differences across services, it is significant to note that 
black representation is generally low in the Tactical 
Operations category, while generally high in the 
Administrators and Supply, Procurement, and Allied categories. 
The significance of this finding is discussed in the next 
section concerning trends in occupational mix throughout the 
drawdown. 
3. Trends in Occupational Ki. 
One major concern throughout the drawdown has been that 
minorities may be adversely affected by reductions due to 
differential effects among occupations. Appendix Tables A26 
through A30 show the percentage distribution in occupational 
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mix for DoD and for e~ch of the services. The occupation with 
the largest decrease, especially in the Army and Air Force, is 
the Tactical Operations category. This is also the cillitegory 
in which blacks have the lowest representation. The 
categories where blacks are most highly represented--
Administrators, and Supply, Procurement, and Allied Officers--
showed smaller declines or even increases. Consequently, had 
all other things been equal, this effect alone would have 
increased the percentage of black officers throughout this 
period. The effect is compounded by the fact that the Army 
and Air Force have the highest black representation in 000, 
and these two services experienced the most pronounced 
occupational shifts favoring blacks. Further evidence of this 
effect is found in Appendix Table Al, where the number of 
black officers actually peaked in 1990 for the Air Force and 
1991 for the Army, yet the percentage of black officers 
continued to increase throughout the entire period. 
B. RESULTS OF IlULT:IVJoR:IATE MODELS 
Appendix C conta i ns the results of the log-linear 
survival and logit separation models described in Chapter III. 
The findings from these models are summarized below. Due to 
the small numbers of minorities in many of the samples 
modeled, statistical significance is measured at the .20 level 
for the discussion below. Higher levels of significance can 
be determined by comparing the chi-sqUare and Wald chi-square 
values with the critical values listed at the beginning of 
Appendix C. The means of the variables, the sample size, as 
well as the number of leavers during the phase are contained 
within the table for each model. Additionally, log likelihood 
ratio tests, model chi-squares, and concordant ratios are 
presented to indicate goodness-of-fit of each model. 
It was desirable to model the effects of the minority 
status variables separately, in attempting to understand 
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differences in separation behavior among the minority groups. 
Because the models were specified in this manner, statistical 
significance was not achieved in many cases for minorities 
other than blacks. For this reason, the discussion be low 
centers primarily on black officer separation probabilities. 
1. Loq-liD.ar aurvival V.raUa Loqit a.paratioD Kodel. 
The log-linear survival and logit separation models 
differ in the dependent variable that is regressed on the 
explanatory variables. The log-linear models uses the lO9(of 
the months of commissioned service until separation as the 
dependent variable). Thus, the parameter estimates can be 
interpreted as a relative change in months of commissioned 
service given an absolute c hange in the explanatory variable, 
The log-linear regression equation can be used to estimate 
typical survival times for selected cases. Since the 
dependent variable is a natural logarithm, exponentiating the 
sum of the parameters plus the intercept for the desired case 
will yield survival time. By setting all dummy explanatory 
variables in the model to zero and assuming the continuous 
explanatory variables to be at the mean, exponentiating the 
intercept will yield the expected survival time of the base 
case. Then, by setting desired dummy explanatory variables to 
one and exponentiating the sum of the right-hand side of the 
equation will yield the expected survival time of the case in 
question. (Afifi and Clark, 1990) 
The log it separation models yield parameter estimates 
that reflect the change in the log (of the odds) of Bep~rating 
during the phase. This is more readily interpreted by 
multiplying the parameter by P(l-P), where P is the base 
probability of leaving during the phase (leavers divided by 
sample size). This conversion yields a direct change in 
probability given a one unit Change in the explanatory 
Variable . ThUS, the BLACK variable in the 1977 ArlIIy attrition 
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phase log it model, with a parameter estimate of 0.3883, can be 
interpreted as a 0.0085 absolute increase constant. 
since the focus of this thesis is to identify general 
trends in minority separation behavior relative to non-
minorities, the discussion below focuses primarily on the 
logit separation models, which yield simply an increase or 
decrease in separation probability. For ease of reference, 
Tables 5 through 8, at the end of this chapter. present a 
summary of results for black and Hispanic officers for each 
cohort, by service and phase. The tables present the 
parameter estimates for the log-linear models, and the 
absolute change in separation probability for the logit 
separation models. 
2 . Army Jlodel Results 
Examination of the Army separation models revealed an 
interesting pattern of black officer separation. Black 
officers were much more likely than whites to leave during the 
attrition phase (Phase I) for all years. In the 1977, 1980, 
and 1987 cohorts, however, black officers became less likely 
to leave than their white counterparts during the early leave 
decision phase (Phase II). At the career decision phase, 
black officers who entered in 1977 were again much more likely 
to leave than whites. In the 1980 cohort, which reached the 
career decision point at the height of the drawdown, black 
officers were less likely to leave than whites. In the 1983 
cohort, black separation behavior had returned to the 1977 
pattern. Additionally, black officers of the 1977 cohort were 
more likely to separate during the early retirement 
eligibility phase . 
Due to the lack of statistical significance, little can 
be said concerning trends in separation behavior of other 
minority groups or of women. Age at entry into the service 
appeared to have a large effect upon separation probability. 
The older a person was upon cOllUO.issioning, the more likely he 
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or she was to separate. In general, academy graduates and 
officers holding advanced degrees were less likely to 
separate. Officers in tactical operations were generally less 
likely to separate than officers in other occupations, except 
in the 1987 cohort, where they were more likely to separate 
during each of the three phases examined. 
3. • .. vy Kod.l Results 
Black officer separation patterns in the Navy were very 
similar to those found in the Army. Blacks had a very high 
probability of leaving during the attrition phase (Phase I) of 
all four cohorts compared with whites. Following the 1977 
cohort, blacks in the early decision phase (Phase II) were not 
statistically different from whites. However, during the 
career p h ase (Phase III), blacks once again became much more 
likely to leave than whites. There was no significant 
difference between whites and blacks in the late decision or 
early retirement phases for the 1977 year group. 
The 1980 and 1983 year groups differed from the 1977 
cohort in that there was no difference statistically between 
white and black separation during the career phases (Phase 
III) for these two cohorts. It is important to note that the 
career phase for the 1980 and 1983 cohorts occurred during the 
drawdown years, while it occurred just prior to the drawdown 
for the 1977 cohort. Contrary to a priori hypotheses, women 
were generally no different than men in their separation 
probability, and where significant differences did exist, 
women were less likely to leave . 
In general, the other explanatory variables had similar 
effects as in the Army. Age-at-entry increased one's 
separation probability, at least in the earlier career phase, 
while academy graduates, those with advanced degrees, and 
those in operational occupations were less likely to leave. 
Officers in the operational occupations were, however, 
significantly more likely to separate during the career 
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decision phase for the 1983 cohort only. This phase occurred 
at the height of the drawdown for the Navy, and may be 
associated with the VSI/SSB offerings in 1993 and 1994. 
•. Air Poree Kedel .esult. 
The pattern of black separation behavior established in 
the earlier discussions of the Navy and the ArDly was even more 
pronounced in the Air Force. Black off leers demonstrated a 
much higher propensity to leave in the attrition phases (Phase 
1), while showing a much lower separation probability in the 
early decision phases (Phase II) for the 1977, 1980, and 1983 
year groups. The 19B7 cohort is somewhat of an anomaly in 
that there was no statistical difference between whites and 
blacks in either phase examined. Blacks were also more likely 
to leave during the early retirement phase (Phase V) than 
whites for the 1977 cohort. 
The career phases (Phase III) of the 1977 , 1980, and 1983 
cohorts provide an interesting comparison. In the 1977 
cohort, blacks sho .... ed a much higher probability of leaving 
(0.1381 or 68 percent). In the 1980 cohort, this phenomenon 
.... as reversed .... ith blacks 49 percent less likely to separate. 
The 1983 cohort, .... hich reached the career decision phase much 
later in the period examined, blacks were 28.3 percent more 
likely to separate than whites. This pattern is very similar 
to .... hat was seen in the Army career decision phases. 
There are at least two possible explanations for this 
pattern of behavior. The first is that, since the Army and 
the Air Force entered the drawdown earlier than the Navy, the 
effects of newly impl emented drawdown policies wore off 
sooner, and separation behavior has begun to return to pre-
drawdown (1977 cohort) patterns. The second explanation is 
that the career phases might have been incorrectly identified 
due to the downsizing induced disruption of the "normal" 
cohort behavior. It is important to remember that the Navy, 
which entered the c1rawdown later, had no significant 
53 
difference in the separation behavior of whites and blacks at 
the career phase for the 1983 cohort. 
Women in the Air Force demonstrated greater differences 
compared with men than in the other services. Women were 
generally more likely to separate during the early leave 
decision phases of all cohorts. Women were more likely to 
leave than men during the attrition phase of the 1977 cohort; 
but, in the 1983 and 1987 cohorts, this finding was reversed. 
In the later career phases, women were typically more likely 
to stay than men. 
Other explanatory variables had similar effects to what 
was found in the other services. Graduate education seemed to 
have a particularly strong effect in the Air Force. Once 
again, those categorized as tactical operations officers were 
less likely to separate during most phases. 
S. Karin. Corp. Kodel aeeulte 
Little can be said concerning trends in minority 
separation behavior in the Marine Corps due to the small 
number of officers modeled in each phase and the consequent 
lack of statistical significance. Blacks were significantly 
more likely to leave during the career decision phases (Phase 
III) of 1977 and 1980. Similarly, they were more likely than 
whites to separate during the attrition and early leave 
decision phases of the 1983 and 1987 cohorts. 
fii. Summary of Hod.l a.sul ts 
A general pattern of separation appears evident among 
black officers for the time period examined in this research. 
Prior to the drawdown, blacks tended to have high early 
attrition rates compared with whites, but low or at least 
decreased separation probabilities in the early decision phase 
(from three to ten years of service). At the career decision 
point, assumed to be associated with promotion to 0-4, blacks 
again showed a higher probability of separating. This 
tendency (of higher separation during the career phase) 
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appeared to decrease during the drawdown. but may have re-
emerge d in later cohorts. In two of the four services, blacks 
had a significantly higher probability of leaving than whites 
in the early retirement window present in the 1977 cohort. In 
the other two services, there was no statistical difference 
between whites and blacks in the early retirement window. 
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Table 5. Summary of Log-linear Parameter Estimates and 
Changes in separation probability for Black and Hispanic 
Officers by Service and by Career Phase--1977 Cohorts 
Black Officers Hispanic Officers 
service Career Log-lin 6 Prob Log-lin 6 Prob 















-1.1452* 0 . 0085* -2.6361* 0.0252* 
0.1551* -0 . 0746* -0.1953* 0.0285 
-0.1942* 0.0617* 0.0049 -0.0044 
0.1160 -0 . 0102 0 . 1175 -0.0117 
-0.1057* 0.0417* -0.1066 0.0441 
-1.5139* 0.0195* 1.6176 -0.0215 
-0.2452* 0 . 0547* 0.0158 -0.0259 
-0.3774* 0.01025* -0.0959 0.0444 
-0.1771 0.0398 0.5929* -0.1744 
-0.1226* 0.0794 0.0815 -0.0473 
-2.1173* 0.0343* -0.7745 0.0208 
0.1944* -0.0777* 0.1480 -0.0409 
-0.4469* 0.1381* 0.0652 -0.0250 
0 . 0602 -0.0186 -0.0019 -0.0115 
-0 . 1337* 0.0798* -0.0551 0 . 0359 
Mar ines f---''---l--'-O .:..:8..:.5","+_--,0:..: • ..:.03",9:..:9+_-..:'..:.. 9"'0..:.9..:.'.+..:.0:..:.0..:.."'02:....-1 
II -0.1561 0.0294 -0.5879* 0.2224* 
III -0.6830* 0.2526* -0.2516 0 . 1085 
IV -0.0088 -0.0141 
The parameter estImate from tne ~og- Inear survIva 
.odels in Appendix C. 
lorhe change in separation probability compared to whites. 
*statistically significant at the .20 level (or higher). 
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Table 6. Summary of Log-linear Parameter Estimates and 
Changes in Separation Probabi lity for Black and Hispanic 
Officers by Service and by Career Phase--1980 Cohorts 
Black Officers Hispanic Off icers 
Service Career Log-lin 6 Prob Log-lin 6 Prob 


















-2 . 0186J1< 
-0.0418 






0 . 0258J1< -0.0513 -0.0003 
-0 . 1079J1< -0 . 3706 0.1671J1< 
-0.0178 0.07 96 -0.048 7 
0.0003 -0.3737 0.0133 
0.0371J1< -1. 6354J1< 0 . 0286J1< 
0.0226 0.2183 -0.1165J1< 
-0.0133 -0.2890Jl< 0.0960* 
-0 . 0440 0.3717 -0.0915 
0.0117J1< 3. 3364J1< -0 . 0566J1< 
-0 . 0704J1< -0 . 0366 -0.0017 
-0 . 0627J1< 0.0086 -0.0038 
-0 . 0180 -0 . 0349 0.0220 
Mar ines e----==----J----=-=-=-I-----'-'='-'--iI---==-=-+-----1 -0.0162 41.9423 
II -0.0767 -0.0209 -0.0644 0.0161 
III -0.3609J1< 0.1254 -0.2260 0.0877 
IV -0.7010 0 . 0714 11.3803 
IThe parameter estimate from the log-linear survival 
models in Appendix C. 
~he change in separation probability compared to whites. 
*statistically significant at the .20 level (or higher). 
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Table 7. Summary of Log-linear Parameter Estimates and 
Changes in Separation Probability for Black and Hispanic 
Officers by Service and by Career Phase--1983 Cohorts 
Black Officers Hispanic Officers 
Service Career Log-lin • Prob Log-lin • Prob Phase estimatel of sepl estiptate of Sepl 
Army -1. 0335* 0.0269* 0.9507 -0.0273 
II -0.0458 0 . 0315* -0.0102 0.0182 
III -0.1694* 0.0564* -0.3922 0.1422 
Navy -1.3818* 0.0379* -2.194S* 0.0591* 
II 0.0989 -0.0274 -0.1883* 0.0340 
III -0 . 0733 0.0149 -0.4122* 0 . 0931* 
Air -1. 6457* 0.032S* 0.0393 -0.0024 
Force 
II 0.3222* -.1154* 0.0525 -0.0400 
III -0.2217* 0.0562* -0.4128* 0 . 0891* 
IV' -0.0050 -0.0018 -0.7591* 0.0371* 
Marines -2.0286* 0.0337* 0.6541 -0.0127 
II -0 . 4048* 0.1644* -0 . 3529* 0.1487* 
III -0.3150 0.0822 15.7442 
IThe parameter estimate from the log-linear survival 
Jlodele in Appendix C. 
'l<J'he change in separation probability compared to 'Whites . 
JAn additional Late Decision Phase 'Was identified in the 
1983 Air Force cohort (see Appendix B, Figure 11). 
*statistically significant at the . 20 level (or higher). 
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Table 8. Summary of Log-linear Parameter Estimates and 
Changes in Separation Probability for Black and Hispanic 
Off icers by Service and by Career Phase--1987 Cohorts 
Black Officers Hispanic Officers 





Phase estimate! of Sepl estiplate of sepl 
-0.4410 0.0134* -1.3457* 0.0322* 
II 0.3184* -0.0750* -0.0809 0.0235 
-1.5781* 0.0309* -2.3750* 0.0579* 
II 0.1223 -0.0333 0.3002* -0.0911* 
0.1156 0.0020 -1.8954* 0.0415* 
II 0.1388 -0.0239 0.1965 -0.0196 
Marines f---f---'-" '_8_"_'+_o_"_o_17_7_'+_-_'_" 6_'_5_' +-_0_"_0_14_7-1 
II -0.4034* 0.1491* 0.0165 0.0631 
IThe parameter estimate from the log-linear survival 
models in Appendix C. 
11te change in separation probability compared to whites. 
*Statistically significant at the .20 level (or higher). 
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V. VSI I BBD BEPARATIOII IIiCERTIVE .ODELS 
In the final part of this analysis, VSI!SSB data files 
from the Air Force (1992 and 1993) and the Navy (1993) were 
examined. These files were constructed by DKDC to include 
only those eligible to receive the early separation incentives 
during the fiscal year that the program was offered. Each 
fiscal year was modeled separately, due to the fact that the 
incentives were targeted to certain populations that varied by 
service and by year. The sections below describe the model 
specification used to analyze the probability of acceptance of 
VSI/SSB. 
A. VaI/SSD KODEL SPECIFICATION 
The logit regression models used to examine acceptance of 
VSI/SSB are very similar to the logit models used to evaluate 
separation in the Chapters III and IV. In this case, the 
probability of separating under the VSl/SSB program is modeled 
as a function of race, gender, age, number of dependents, 
source of commission, rank, education, years of service, 
months in grade, and occupation. 
Table 9 presents a list and brief description of the 
explanatory variables used in the VSl/SSB models. Again, the 
race variables--BLACK, HISPANIC, ASIAN/PI, and OTHMINOR--are 
the primary focus of this analysis. The variable FEMALE is 
expected to indicate a higher probability of separation, while 
NUMDEPS is predicted to indicate a lower acceptance rate. 
The years of service variable, YOS, is expected to be 
associated with a lower acceptance probability, due to the 
fact that individuals with higher years of service are lDuch 
closer to retirement. Additionally, this variable captures 
the impact of prior enlisted service, Which, of course, counts 
toward retirement eligibility. Thus, those with more service 
time have a much higher cost-of-leaving due to the large 
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potential loss of retirement benefits . The months in grade 
variable, KIG, is included, based on the notion that those who 
are slower to be promoted might be more likely to leave the 
military in search of more suitable employment. Thus, 
Table 9. Description of Explanatory Variables for VSI/SSB 
Models 
Variable Description 
BLACK coded 1 if black, 0 otherwise 
HISPANIC coded 1 if Hispanic, 0 otherwise 
ASIAN/PI coded 1 if Asian/Pacific Islander, 0 
otherwise 
OTHMINOR coded 1 if other minority, 0 otherwise 
FEMALE coded 1 if female, 0 if male 
AGE continuous variable for age 
YOS continuous variable for years of service 
lUG continuous variable for months in grade 
NUMDEPS continuous variable for number of 
dependents 
ACAD coded 1 if an academy graduate, 0 otherwise 
LTJG, LCDR, dummy variables for rank dependent upon 
FIRSTLT, paygrade and service 
KAJOR , 
LTCOL 
POSTGRAD coded 1 if held a Master' s or higher 
degree, 0 otherwise 
OPERATNL coded 1 if a Tactical Operations Off icer, 0 
otherwise 
officers with more months in grade are predicted to accept 
VSI/SSB at a higher rate. Among the rank variables, LTJG, 
LCDR, FIRSTLT, MAJOR, and LTCOL, (0-3 , Air Force captain and 
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Navy Lieutenant is the omitted category) it is expected that 
officers with lower ranks would be lIIore likely to accept the 
separation incentive, again because they would be farther from 
retirement eligibility. Additionally, the lower rank would 
indicate a lesser accumulation of firm-specific human capital. 
The variables POSTGRAD and OPERATNL are predicted to have 
similar effects as in the earlier mOdels, namely a lower 
separation probability for POSTGRAD, and an undetermined 
effect for the OPERATNL variable. 
B . Val/SSB KODEL aZ:SULT8 
The sections below summarize the results from the VSI/SSB 
models. Each incentive offering was modeled separately (by 
service and fiscal year) due to differences in the targeted 
populations. 
1 . Air Fore. FY 1"2 VSI/SSB OU".ring 
Table 10 presents the results of the logit model for the 
VSI/SSB incentive offered to Air Force Officers in 1992. In 
this population of 12,167 eligibles (observations with missing 
data were deleted), 2,324 officers accepted the incentive for 
a take-rate of 19.10 percent (9 percent VSI/lO.l percent SSB). 
Examination of the parameter estimates indicates that 
black officers were significantly less likely to accept the 
incentive than were whites. Although the signs of the 
estimates for all other minority groups were negative, there 
was no statistical difference between those groups and whites. 
Among the other variables, women were much more likely to 
accept the separation bonus than were men, while Air Force 
officers with a greater number of dependents were slightly 
.ore likely to take the bonus than were those with smaller 
families. Years of service had a negative effect on 
acceptance as did graduate education and being a tactical 
operations officer. Compared with 0-3s, 0-2s and 0-55 were 
less likely to accept the bonus, while 0-4s were more likely. 
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2. Air Poree PY 1993 VSl/SSB Offering' 
Table 11 presents the results of the second fiscal year 
that VSI/SSB was offered to Air Force officers. As seen in 
Table 6, the population that this incentive was offered to was 
almost double in size to that of the previous year. Of 23,036 
eligibles. 2,693 accepted for a take-rate of 11.7 percent. 
Again, .ore takers opted for VSI (6.3 percent) than for SSB 
(5.4 percent). Note that there is a potential truncation 
problem in this sample. Since 2.324 ofl"icers accepted the 
offer (out of 12,167 who were eligible) in the previous year, 
they selected themselves out of the 1993 sample . Thus, the 
eligible population is no longer randomly selected and the 
estimated coefficients will tend to be biased. 
In this population, blaCks and Asian/Pacific Islanders 
were more likely to accept the incentive (significant only at 
the .20 level). There was no difference statistically for 
women, Hispanics, and other minorities. The difference 
between these results and tha t for 1992 may be due to sample 
truncation. 
Years of service, again, had a strong negatiVe impact on 
acceptance, as did holding' a g'raduate degree and being an 
academy alumnus. Majors and Lieutenant Colonels were both 
less l ikely to separate under the bonus than were captains. 
There were no 0-2s in this eligible population . Months in 
grade was statistically significant and indicated an increase 
in separation prObability under the bonus. 
3. .avy PY 1993 VSl/SSB Offering' 
The Navy did not offer VSI/SSB to its officers until 
1993 . Table 12 below depicts the results of the log it 
reg'ression .odel on the Navy incentive program. Of 14,879 
eligibles (after obs ervations with aissing data were deleted), 
853 accepted for a take-rate of only 5.7 percent. In the 
Navy, a larger number opted for the SSB incentive (3.6 
percent) than for VSl (2.1 percent). 
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The parameter estimates indicate that all minorities took 
the incentive at a lower rate than did whites, but only the 
coefficients for Hispanics and Asian/Pacific Islanders reached 
statistical significance. As 1n the first year of the Air 
Force offering, women were much Dore likely to accept the 
bonus than were men. 
Naval officers with high years of service and an advanced 
degree were auch less likely to accept the incentives than 
those with lower years of service or with only an 
undergraduate degree. Behavior of officers categorized in 
tactical operations more closely mirrored the 1993 Air Force 
population by showing an increased probability of acceptance. 
Lieutenants (Junior Grade) and Lieutenant Commanders 
significantly less likely to take the incentive than were 
Lieutenants (0-35) . 
4. Suamary of VSI/SSB Kodels 
It is probably most appropriate to compare the 1992 Air 
Force results with the 1993 Navy results, since those are the 
years that the separation incentives vere first offered within 
the respective services. Among these two popUlations, 
minorities vere generally less likely to accept, vhile women 
were more likely to accept . In the 1993 Air Force population, 
however, minorities were somewhat more likely to take the 
separation incentive, probably owing to the truncation issue. 
As expected, the models revealed that years of service, 
advanced education, occupation, and rank were significant 
predictors of accepting the bonus. Although statistically 
significant, months in grade was of little practical 
significance . Academy graduates demonstrated a significantly 
lower probability of acceptance only in the 1993 Air force 
population. 
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Table 10. 1992 Air Force VSI/SSB Acceptance Model 
ASIAN/PI 
Ob.erv.tion. IN-) 
B •• e Probability 
of Acceptinq 
Concordant Ratio 
Loqi.tic Reqr .... ion Mod .. l 
0.4533 
69.3 
Table 11. 1993 Air Force VSI/SSB Acceptance Model 

















Logi.tic ReqrelJlJion Modal 
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VI. COJiCLUBIONB AIfI) aZeOHKEllDA'I'IOJlS 
A. COJICLUSIONS 
This thesis attempts to assess the effects of the recent 
military downsizing on minority officer retention and other 
representation issues. Available data suggest minorities have 
not been adversely affected by the drawdown, at least in t he 
area of retention. 
The cross-sectional analysis reveals that minority 
representation has generally increased across all services 
throughout the downsizing, period with the possible exception 
of the higher paygrades. Minority representation for officers 
of the grade 0-6 and above did not change much throughout the 
1987-1994 period, and remains at relatively low levels 
compared to the lower officer paygrades. There is some 
evidence that shifts in the occupational mix of officers 
during the downsizing may have aided the increase in minority 
representation, especiallY in the Army and Air Force. 
Two somewhat disturbing phenomena were discovered in the 
longitudinal analysis--namely, the increased probability of 
early (zero to three years) attrition for black officers, and 
the increased tendency of black officers to exit at key career 
decision points. The high early attrition rates are most 
likely associated with failures in the initial training 
pipeline. The increased tendency for separation at key career 
decision point is evidenced by the higher separation 
probabilities of blacks around ten to fourteen years of 
cOJD]Dissioned service, depending upon branch, as well as 
increased probabilities of separation during early retirement 
eligibility. 
Two factors are likely to be influencing minority 
decisions with respect to this behavior. The first is the 
fact that, although the military's equal opportunity climate 
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is perceived to be better than in the private sector, there 
are still questions about the prospects of long-term military 
career for lIIinorities. The low number of minority 0-6s, flag, 
and general officers attest to this perception of a "glass 
ceiling" and certain career limitations at the top. A second 
factor that is likely influencing minority behavior is the 
competition from the private sector for highly qualified 
minorities with distinguished records of service in the 
military. 
Drawdown policies and programs such as VSI/SSB appear to 
have had an equalizing effect on differences in separation 
behavior between racial and ethnic groups. It wil l be 
important now to see if these differences reemerge after 
drawdown policies end no longer in force. There is some 
evidence in the pres ent study that this may already be 
happening. 
B. .eCOMKENDATIOIfS J'OR J'UTURe •• SEARCH 
Based on these findings, the following recommendations 
are offered. The multivariate mode l s used in this analysis 
could be bolstered in many ways. Performance is undoubtably 
linked to the retention decision, just as it is to promotion. 
consequently, the predictability of the models could be 
improved by the inclusion of one or more measures of 
performance. The VSI/SSB models could be improved by the 
inclusion of an ACOL variable that captures future promotion 
probability and expected civilian and milita ry earnings. 
A detailed study needs to be conducted of early officer 
attrition . It is apparent that minority officers with zero to 
three years of commissioned service leave the military at 
higher rates than their non-minority peers. This is opposite 
to what has been found in the enlisted force. Defense 
Manpower officials, policy analysts, and others should be 
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asking: "Why is this happening, and what can be done about 
it?" 
Next, since the higher mid-career separation rates of 
minorities compared to non-minorities appear to be associated 
with promotion to 0-4, continuing research should focus on the 
link between retention and promotion at this career point. 
From a policy standpoint, cOllllllanding officers, detailers, and 
others with career-counseling responsibilities need to be 
aware that this is a critical decision point for minority 
officers and that stressing the improvements in the military's 
equal opportunity atmosphere may help reduce minority 
separations. 
Finally, it will be important to look at minority 
retention and representation issues throughout the remainder 
of the drawdown and beyond to see if trends identified 
previous to the drawdown reemerge. It is quite clear that 
minority representation issues will be of concern to the 
military for many years to come. 
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APPENDIX A. RESULTS OP CROBB-SECTIONAL lUlALYSIS 
This appendix contains selected results of cross-
tllbulations performed on the DHDC end of year cross-sectional 
files for fiscal 1987 through 1994, inclusive. Minority 
representation figures (for paygrades 0-1 through 0-10) 
presented by service as well as by selected paygrades and 
occupations. The final tables indicate the shift in the 
occupational mix of officers throughout the drawdown for each 
service. 
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APPENDIX B. SEPARATION PROBAllILILITY DEN8ITY FUNCTIONS 
This appendix contains graphs of the separation 
probability density functions for each cohort--1977, 1980, 
1983, and 1987--by service. Tbe graphs represent the 
probability of separation of a randomly selected individual at 
any given month of commissioned service . Additionally, these 
graphs indicate the breakpoints for each phase of separation 
behavior that was modeled. Phases that occurred during the 
drawdown years are annotated. 
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APPEBDIX C. RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE MODELS 
This appendix contains the resu l ts of the log-linear and 
logistic multivariate regression models described and 
evaluated in Chapters III and IV. The models were estimated 
for each identifiable phase of separation behavior, by service 
and by year . Statistical signif i cance for each variable is 
indicated by the chi-square value for the log-linear models, 
and the Wald chi-s quare value for the logistic regre s sion 
models, compared with the critical values listed below: 
• Z: 6.6358 indicates significance at the .01 leve l; 
.2:. 3.8416 indicates significance at the .05 l evel; 
.2:. 2 . 7060 indicates significance at the .10 level; and 

















Logit Sepa. ration Model 








Table Cl. 1977 Army "Attrition Phase" separation Models 
12' 
.6P 
Lo<Jit Separation Hodel 
x' p Wald X2 6P/6X '6P 
5.1242 -0.2983 
2.5659 IL 0.1139 
-0.0142 0.0167 I 0.0013 0.0003 0.1 
22 . 5932 II -0.3854 13.5167 -0.0963 
1.6381 693.0711 11 -0.6197 
0.0225 I 7.0640 -34.5 
22.7301 I -O.O!:,S4 25.3070 I: 0.0845 










not Ilppl icable 
0.4973 
80.4 








COncordant R .. tio 
Log-Linea r 
S'Irvival Model 
Logit Separation Model 
x' Wald X2 6P/6X '6P 
6.2028 
8.0555 




not applicable 150.026 
not applicable 












Logit Separation Model 
x' Wald X2 6Pl6X \; 6P 
-0.0102 -21.7 
-0.0032 -6.8 
-1.3796 2.4101 0.1081 
0.4263 
-------- 1 -------




not applicab l e 54.270 
not applicable 















Logit Separation Model 




Table CS . 1977 Army "Early Retirement Phase" separation Models 
12. 
Loq-Limtar Log"it Separation Model 
S1.lrvival Mode l 
X' p Wa l d X' 6P/6X , 6P 









Oba .. rvatione ( N-) 
Baa .. Probability nc' applicable 
cf Leaving 
Log Likelihood no' applicab l e 
Ratio 
Mo de l X' no' applic abla 
COncordant Ratio no' applicable 














not appl icable 
Logit Separation Mod .. l 


















Legit Sepllration Model 











not applicable 111.082 
not applicable 64.3 
Table CB. 1980 Army "Career Decision Phase" Separation Models 
131 
ASIAN/PI 














Loqit separation Model 






















Loqit Separation MOdel 





















Logit Separation Model 
WoIIld X2 6P/6X \ 6P 
73. 2 496 
-1.3123 
not applicable 

















not appl icable 
Logit separation Model 






















Lo9it Separation Model 





















Logit. soparation Hodel 
Wald X2 6P!6X '6P 
not applicable 




of L .... ving 
-Log Lik.elihood 






not .applic .. ble 
not applicable 
Lo'1it Separation Model 
W.ald X2 6P/6X '6P 
not .applicable 


















Loqit Separation Model 







Table C16. 1977 Navy "Early Decision Phase" Separation Models 
13. 











Loqit Separat i on Model 




Table C17. 1977 Navy ·Career Decision Phase" Separation Models 
140 
21.8214 













Logit Separation Model 
Wald X2 6P/6X '6P 
-1. 3021 1. 5120 
-0.0692 
not applicable 
Table C1.8. 1977 Navy "Late Decision Phase" Separation Models 
141 













Loqit Separation Kadel 
Wald X 2 6P/6X '6P 
0.0473 
0.0002 
-0 . 5463 
not applicable 
















Lot;l'it Separation Kodel 






















Loqit Separa tion Hode l 





Table e2l. 1980 Navy -Early Decision Phase" Separation Models 
144 
Loq-Linear Logit Separation Model 
survival Nodel 
Variable X' Wald X' 6P/6X , 6P 
0.0299 0.0950 -0.0151 0.0610 
-0.2890 1.1616 
0.0012 1.1314 2.1869 -1.1036 -0.3020 
ASIAN/PI -0.2415 1.1075 0.3412 0.6721 
0.1539 1.9099 -0.2388 1.5875 -0.0423 
0.0540 0.0826 4.4420 -0.0146 
0.2394 
0.0049 
0.1802 2.9946 -0.0503 
0.6413 55.1021 55.9252 
0.0278 0.0517 -0.0093 
0.0167 }.1611 1.0509 -0.0222 
Obaervation. (M-) 2210 2210 
509 
ea.e Probability not applieable 0.2303 
of lAavinq 
Log: Likelihood not applicable 
Ratio 
""".1 X' not applicable 
Concordant RatiO not applicable 
























Loqit Separation Model 


































l.o9it Separation Model 

































Logit separation Kode l 




0 . 3466 
23.1043 
-0.4430 270.326 -0.1106 -21.5 
-0.3049 11.6032 
-0.5 223 -101.4 
0.5153 
not applieable 
1083 . 009 
Table C25. 1983 Navy -Early Decision Phase" Separation Models 
148 
Loq-Lin.ar Logit Separation Model 
Survival Model 
X' Wald X' 6P/6X ••• 
0.1701 0.0963 0.1269 7.8 
3.1649 0.6010 0.0931 48.6 
0.0041 -0.1738 0.1051 0.2061 0.0629 
ASIAN/PI 0.0217 -0.3303 2.2099 0.4887 39.5 
0.1200 0.7466 0.0256 13.4 
-0.0945 -0.0146 
-0.U30 
22.3727 0.0000 0.0 
0.1938 24.7207 
-75.0 
0.3628 25.374' -52.9 
-0.0023 
Ob.ervations (N") 2208 
Ba •• Probability no' applicable 0.1916 
of Leaving 
Log Lik.lihood -1365.429443 no' applicable 
Ratio 
Mod. l X' no' applicable 
Concordant Ratio no, applicable 
Table C 26. 1983 Nllvy ·Ca reer Decision Phase" Separation Models 
149 
Log Linear Loqit Separation Model 
Survival Model 
X' Wald X~ 6P/6X .6P 
0.0406 5.1112 





0.1036 3.8556 -1.4059 -133.6 
33.9101 
26.1288 -5.2159 2'L0041 
Obaervationa (N-) 
Baae Probability not applicable 
of Leavinq 
Loq Likelihood -1056.676269 not applicable 
Ratio 
Mod.l X' not applicable 389.962 
Concordant. Rat.io not applicable 
Table C27. 1987 Navy "Attrition Phase" Separation Models 
150 
Loq-Lin.ar Lol;1it Separation Model 
Survival Model 
Variable X' Wa ld X' 6P/6X , 6P 
0.1223 -0.1343 0.5336 -0.0333 
-0.0911 
-0.7222 0.6676 2.0610 36.2 




0.6323 72.0U8 0.6330 51.8281 
2.4058 90.9278 99.2931 
0.0129 
0.6622 -0.1503 
Ob •• rvat ion. (N'-, 
Ba •• Probability no' applicable 0.4576 
of Leavinl;1 
Loq Likelihood -.f.872.403019 no' applicable 
Ratio 
Model X' no' applicable 779.456 
Concordant RatiO no' applicable 
Table C28. 1987 Navy "Early Decision Phase" Separation Models 
151 
Log Lineal' Logit Sepal'ation Model 
Survival Model 
Val'iable p X' Wald X' 6P!6X .6P 
11.9046 1.0941 18.4115 105.9 
0.5133 1.1436 O. 0208 
6.8918 1.1424 119.1 
61.5949 2.8669 
0.9101 0.3066 1.4385 
8.1185 11.9635 185.1 
22.3138 21.4361 0.0086 
0.1914 121.2153 0.1430 
1.2338 -123.9 
1.2168 0.0246 
4}.6311 51.1310 -0.0539 
Obael'vationa IN-) 
BalM! Probability not applicable 0.0324 
of Leaving 
Log Likelihood -135.0383901 not appl icable 
RAtio 
Model X' not applicable 394.211 
Concordant Ratio not applicable 88.0 




















Loqit Separation Model 
Wald X2 6P!6X '6P 
-0.1124 
0.0427 








Table ClO. 1977 Air Force "Early Decision Phase" separation Models 
15) 
Loq-Linear Loqit Separation Mod.l 
Survival Model 
p X' Wald X' 6P!6X 
0.0801 31.5051 
0 .0198 0.0652 
-0.1748 
0.0889 -0.0044 
2.2582 9.3714 -0.1083 
13.0338 
2.5900 -0.0080 







































LO'ij'it Separation Kodel 
Wald X' 6P/6X , 6P 
-23.1 
-82.1 














Logit Separat i on Kodel 








not appl icable 
not appl ieable 
not applicable 101.342 
not applicabl e 













Lo'iJit Separation Model 
6P/6X 




-0 . 0076 
-0 . 0111 



























Logit Separation Bodel 
Wald Xl 6P/6X \ 6P 
-0.3695 
not applie&ble 












L09it Separation MCldal 
x' Wald X2 6P/6X '6P 
0.l912 2.2136 -0.6227 






-IB46.042314 not ... pplieable 
not epplieabl . 
not applieable 

















Loqit Separation Model 






Table CJ7. 1980 Air Force "Late Decision Phase" separation Models 
160 
Log-Linear Loqit Separation Model 
Survival Model 
Variable X' Wald X' 6P/6X • OP 
10.9 
0.1358 -0.0086 










Ba.e probability not applicable 
o f Leaving 
Loq Likelihood not applicable 
Ratio 
Model X' not applicable 
COncordant Ratio not applicable 










Concord .. nt R .. tio 
Log-Lin .... r 








Logit Separation Model 























not appl i cable 
not applicable 
Lo9it S.paration Model 























Loqit Separation ModCll 













Ob •• rvationa (N- ) 
aa •• Probability 
ot Ltlavinq 














not app1 icab1. 
not eppl icable 
Log-it separation Model 
Wa1d X' 6P/6X • 6P 
5.5876 0.0415 
1.4690 
-0 . 0181 32.4 
-0.5379 
23.1195 -134.6 
1. 7333 2.1394 0.0914 
not applicable 
372.095 




Ba .... Probability 










not appl icable 
not applicable 
Logit. Separation Model 
Waid X2 6P/6X '6P 
0.1948 
not appl icable 














Logit Separation Hodel 























Logit Separation Model 


















Loqit separation Mod.l 









not applicable 19.905 
not applicable 















Logit Sepa r a t.ion Hodel 






Table C47. 1977 Marine Corps "Late Decision Phase" Separation 
Models 
170 
Log-Lil'l.ar Logit Separatiol'l Model 
Survival Hodel 





-0.2909 3.2282 0.0038 
0.1233 
2.8966 -0.0361 
Ob.ervationll (N-) 1209 
Sa.e Probability not appl ieable 0.0265 
of lAoaving 
Log Likelihood not applieable 
Ratio 
_., X' not applieable 
Col'leordal'lt Ratio not appl ieable 68.8 








Logit Separation Model 





Table C49. 1980 Marine Corps "Early Decision Phase" Separation 
Models 
172 
Loq-Lin.ar Loqit Separation Mod .. l 
Survival Mod.l 






21-5483 0.010 4 
5.0771 -0.7781 5.4301 
0.0004 0.2 
Obaervationa (N-) 
Baae Probability not applicable 
of Leaving 
Log Likelihood -2 85 .8936142 not appl icable 
Jtatio 
Model X' not applicable 13.135 
Concordant Jtat io not applicable 




Observ.tions (N_ ) 
B.se Probability 











Logit sep.r.tion Model 






















Loqit Separation Kodel 






Table C52. 1983 Marine Corps "Attrition Phase" separation Models 
175 
ASIAN/PI 










not appl iCable 
not applicable 
not applicable 
Loqit Separation Kadel 
Wald X2 6P/6X , 6P 
not applicable 
















Logit Saparation Hodel 










ea •• Probability 
of I.-aving 









Logit Separation Model 
Wald X2 6P/6X '6P 
-B7.S83 
not applicable 














Logoit Separation Model 
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